
Security Audit Report

Wasmi - WebAssembly (Wasm) Interpreter Stellar

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Prepared for Stellar Network by



Table of Contents

- Disclaimer
- Executive Summary
- Goal
- Scope
- Methodology
- Platform Logic and Features Description
- Code Review Discussion and Findings
 - [C1] CompiledFuncEntity can take more than u32::MAX entries
 - [C2] Inconsistencies in RegisterAlloc Bounds
 - [C3] Underestimated Fuel Consumption of Table and Memory Instructions
 - [C4] Large inputs to raw pointer functions may cause undefined behaviour depending on target
 - [CI1] Best Practices and Notable Particularities
 - [CI2] Results of cargo-audit
 - [Cl3] visit_input_registers does not visit all registers of a RegisterSpan
 - [CI4] Missing copy in select translation
 - Suggested Executor Assertions
 - Translation Output Validation
- Fuzzing Discussion and Findings
 - [F1] Abort on realloc() due to faulty br_table optimization
 - [F2] Translator debug assertion fired due to ref.is_null constant propagation
 - [F3] Segmentation fault due to visit_input_regs bug
 - [F4] Output mismatch between Wasmi and Wasmtime #1
 - [F5] Output mismatch between Wasmi and Wasmtime #2
 - [F6] Output mismatch between Wasmi and Wasmtime #3
 - [F7] Executor hang on unreleased version due to copy_span bug
 - [F8] Executor panic on unreleased version due to br_table_many bug
- Appendix
 - Appendix: Wasmi Instruction Set Overview
 - Appendix: Engine Class Diagrams

- Appendix: FuncTranslator Class Diagrams
- Appendix: Translation Sequence Diagrams
- Appendix: Algorithmic Description of the Translator
 - Control Instructions
 - Parametric Instructions
 - Variable Instructions
 - Reference Instructions
 - Numeric Instructions
 - Vector Instructions
 - Table Instructions
 - Memory Instructions
- Appendix: unsafe Rust Checklist

Disclaimer

This report does not constitute legal or investment advice. You understand and agree that this report relates to new and emerging technologies and that there are significant risks inherent in using such technologies that cannot be completely protected against. While this report has been prepared based on data and information that has been provided by you or is otherwise publicly available, there are likely additional unknown risks which otherwise exist. This report is also not comprehensive in scope, excluding a number of components critical to the correct operation of this system. This report is for informational purposes only and is provided on an "as-is" basis and you acknowledge and agree that you are making use of this report and the information contained herein at your own risk. The preparers of this report make no representations or warranties of any kind, either express or implied, regarding the information in or the use of this report and shall not be liable to you or any third parties for any acts or omissions undertaken by you or any third parties based on the information contained herein.

Blockchain technology is still a nascent software arena, and any related implementation and public offering carries substantial risk.

Finally, the possibility of human error in the manual review process is very real, and we recommend seeking multiple independent opinions on any claims which impact a large quantity of funds.

Executive Summary

Stellar Network engaged Runtime Verification Inc. to conduct a security audit of the Wasmi interpreter, which Wasmi Labs is custodian of. The objective was to review the logic and implementation of critical components of the interpreter and identify any issues that could cause erroneous or undefined behavior that may lead to exploitation or malicious interaction with the Stellar network.

The audit was conducted over the course of 8 calendar weeks (August 21, 2024, through October 16, 2024) and focused primarily on analyzing the executor and translator crates of the interpreter, as well as the abstract relationship between Wasm and Wasmi. Given the large volume and high complexity of code comprising the interpreter, a unique approach was taken to the audit that would result in highest guarantees possible for the allocated time frame. The audit would have two surfaces of analysis, a best effort code review approaching components in order of priority, and dedicated fuzzing using a variety of fuzzers and configurations.

The Wasmi codebase is in excellent shape: Code is generally well-organized, adheres to Rust best practices and contains informative doc comments in various places, as well as explanations for particular invariants which may be unobvious.

The audit led to identifying issues of potential severity for the protocol's health, which have been identified as follows:

- Errors in exceeding bounds: CompiledFuncEntity can take more than u32::MAX entries, Inconsistencies in RegisterAlloc Bounds, Large inputs to raw pointer functions may cause undefined behaviour depending on target
- An error in fuel computation: Underestimated Fuel Consumption of Table and Memory Instructions
- Differences between Wasmi's execution and other WebAssembly interpreters:
 - Output mismatch between Wasmi and Wasmtime #1
 - Output mismatch between Wasmi and Wasmtime #2
 - Output mismatch between Wasmi and Wasmtime #3
- A crash due to a bug in instruction optimizations: Abort on realloc() due to faulty br_table optimization

- A failed assertion due to a translation optimization: Translator debug assertion fired due to ref.is_null constant propagation
- A segmentation fault due to a missed case in a visitor: Segmentation fault due to visit_input_regs bug
- A hang due to faulty logic in an instructions execution: Executor hang on unreleased version due to copy_span bug
- A crash due to a miscalculated branch table offset: Executor panic on unreleased version due to br_table_many bug

In addition, several informative findings, contributions, and general recommendations also have been made, including:

- Improvements in Best Practices and Notable Particularities
- Results of cargo-audit, an automatic dependency analysis
- Documenting a shortfall of a helper function: visit_input_registers does not visit all registers of a RegisterSpan
- A potentially unsound optimization in translation: Missing copy in select translation
- Suggestions involving validation post translation: Suggested Executor Assertions, Translation Output Validation
- Open Source Contributions

Additionally, the document contains a high-level description of Wasmi's design:

- An overview of the Wasmi translation and execution process: Platform Logic and Features
 Description
- Appendices to complement the description:
 - A reference of the Wasmi instruction set: Appendix: Wasmi Instruction Set Overview
 - Diagrams that visualize the translation process: Appendix: Translation Sequence
 Diagrams
 - Diagrams that visualize the data structures used for translation and execution:
 Appendix: Engine Class Diagrams, Appendix: FuncTranslator Class Diagrams
 - A detailed description of the translation process: Appendix: Algorithmic Description of the Translator

At the time of writing, all crashes and output differences have been fixed both in Wasmi's main line as well as in a branch of v0.36.* versions. The potential errors in exceeding bounds and

the fuel miscalculation have been acknowledged but not addressed. Informative findings and suggestions have been acknowledged and partially addressed in Wasmi's main line.

Goal

Given the large volume and high complexity of code comprising the interpreter, Runtime Verification Inc. and Stellar Network agreed on an approach to the audit that would maximize the coverage and quality of analysis performed in the allocated time for the audit. Unfortunately total analysis of such a large and complicated code base would be impossible to achieve in the allocated 8 weeks. Furthermore, the on-going work on the interpreter means there is potential that updates could occur in the future, leaving the value of the analysis locked to a particular version eventually only used for legacy versions of Stellar. Therefore, the approach that would be taken was one of both dynamic analysis with fuzzing and simultaneous code review, with an additional eye towards possible future developments of both Stellar and Wasmi. To elaborate on these branches:

- Dynamic Analysis focused on fuzzing the translator and executor with structured bytecode, utilizing a variety of fuzzing tools both standard and custom to effectively detect possible crashes, identify mismatches with other Wasm implementations, and reveal possible DoS vectors.
- 2. Code Review for the duration of the audit would prioritize recently added logic to the target of the audit (v0.36.0) as there is likely to be more chance of finding errors in newer code. Furthermore, code that had high amounts of unsafe usage would be prioritized, followed by code that has high complexity. This meant that focus would be first directed to the executor, then the translator module, with any remaining code being reviewed should time allow;

The audit focuses on identifying issues in the interpreter's logic and implementation that could potentially create erroneous or undefined behavior and therefore render Stellar network vulnerable to attacks or cause it to malfunction. Furthermore, the audit highlights informative findings that could be used to improve the safety, efficiency, or readability of the implementation.

Scope

The scope of the audit is limited to the code contained in a public Github repository provided by the client (wasmi-labs/wasmi). The version that is the target of the audit is tagged release v0.36.0 which has commit hash 02621ad7a7f769dc97524075a693cc96e2049cb5.

Within the repository are multiple crates and files, some of which are highlighted as in the scope of the audit. The repository and relevant crates and files are described below:

- crates/
 - cli/: entrypoint for fuzzing and code inspection
 - collections/ : helper data structures
 - core/: foundational data and error types for Wasmi execution and translation
 - wasmi/
 - engine/
 - bytecode : Wasmi instruction set
 - executor : Wasmi execution implementation
 - translator/: translation from Wasm to Wasmi
- fuzz/ : fuzz testing harness

The comments provided in the code, a general description of the project, including samples of tests used for interacting with the platform, and online documentation provided by the client were used as reference material.

The audit's focus is the translation of Wasm to Wasmi bytecode and the execution of Wasmi bytecode, in the engine directory of the wasmi crate. It is limited in scope to the artifacts listed above.

Commits addressing the findings presented in this report (with versions 0.36.1-5) have also been analyzed to ensure the resolution of potential issues.

Methodology

As mentioned in section Goal, this audit will have two parallel streams of analysis running: code review, and dynamic analysis through fuzzing. The methodology for each will be described separately.

Findings will be classified according to the Runtime Verification Audit Methodology.

Code Review

It should be restated that manual code review cannot guarantee to find all possible security vulnerabilities as mentioned in Disclaimer, however we have followed the approaches described below to make our audit as thorough as possible.

First, we rigorously reasoned about the intention and design logic of the code, seeking to understand the intention of the Wasmi interpreter design choices, to evaluate if the current implementation is susceptible to security-critical design flaws and to ensure the absence of loopholes in the design logic. To this end, we first carefully analysed the specification of Wasm and understood it's relation to Wasmi, seeking to understand the proposed features of Wasmi and the differences and similarities between the two (details of which are located in Platform Logic and Features Description). We also created design documents and artefacts that we communicated with the client to ensure that our mental model of the design and implementation is accurate.

Second we began review of the Wasmi v0.36.0 source code, focusing on the engine and translator crates that perform the translation from Wasm to Wasmi before execution. The review aimed to ensure that the intended features of Wasmi are indeed implemented error free, and that unintended extra behaviors which may be exploitable are not implemented. Wasmi translation performs optimization of Wasm bytecode, such as constant propagation, or op-code fusion. As part of our analysis we documented the translation from Wasm to Wasmi and produced the first specification of Wasmi external to the source code.

Another priority that concerns the Stellar Network is that v0.36.0 introduces many instances of unsafe code in the upgraded executor crate. Usage of unsafe may present a higher risk of error, since the compiler will relax its guarantees of safety in order to provide the extra features unavailable in safe code. The canonical way to determine safety for unsafe usage is to understand the invariants that must be upheld by the usage (often listed in the data structures documentation), and to provide a safety comment that details how the calling / contextual code

is upholding that invariant. As part of our analysis we inspected each usage of unsafe and endeavour to ensure the invariants are upheld and that the safety comment communicates that accurately.

Fuzzing

To augment our code review, we additionally ran a fuzzing campaign - feeding a barrage of random inputs to the program-under-test as a means to dynamically identify vulnerabilities which might be overlooked by manual review alone. This campaign primarily focused on Wasmi v0.36.0, but eventually switched to the v0.36.x-dev branch to avoid re-encountering the same issues after they were identified and patched. At times, we discovered "shallow" bugs or crashes which prevented the fuzzer from reaching deeper code paths, and we switched to fuzzing the current Wasmi main in the interim until these issues were patched.

We began our fuzzing campaign by identifying testable properties that are expected to hold across all inputs. With Wasmi, later stages of the translation and execution pipeline make implicit assumptions about the correctness of earlier stages (see Translation Output Validation). The resulting interconnectedness makes it difficult to isolate smaller sub-components and their associated invariants, particularly given the scope of the audit relative to the size of the code base. Moreover, fuzzing is a randomized process which benefits from a large number of iterations, so given finite time and compute power, there's a trade-off between the total number of tested properties versus the amount of resources dedicated to testing each one individually.

For all these reasons, we decided the most effective approach was to focus our efforts and resources on a narrowly selected set of end-to-end invariants of the entire interpretation pipeline. This allows these properties to be very thoroughly tested, and the end-to-end nature ensures all components are still covered while increasing the likelihood of identifying vulnerabilities caused exactly by the aforementioned interconnectedness.

To accomplish this end-to-end testing, we generated random Wasm modules, then translated and executed each exported function with randomly generated arguments. We verified memory safety and crash-freedom by running this process with sanitizer instrumentation and debug assertions enabled, and verified functional correctness through differential fuzzing which tests conformance against another established Wasm implementation (wasmtime). Further details are given in Fuzzing Discussion and Findings.

We also gave equal care to how these random inputs are generated, ensuring that our properties are tested against a diversity of inputs adequately covering edge cases. At a high-

level, most fuzzers proceed in the same way: generating random inputs, running them and gathering feedback, then using this feedback to inform the generation of new inputs. However, the particulars of this process varies greatly between tools - using different metrics to decide which inputs are interesting, different mutation strategies to produce new inputs, etc. - making it important to consider multiple options.

Among prominent fuzzers, standard benchmarking such as FuzzBench consistently shows two top contenders for general-purpose fuzzing effectiveness: AFL++ and honggfuzz. We did initial exploratory runs with both of these top choices, using afl.rs and honggfuzz-rs to integrate with the Rust code. For our particular targets, we found that both achieved similar levels of effectiveness, but honggfuzz scaled better across cores out-of-the-box without the need to optimally configure advanced aspects of AFL++. Additionally, honggfuzz can take advantage of more information sources directly from the hardware, allowing faster iteration time by avoiding instrumentation when desired, as well as providing a base for the custom execution-time based fuzzing we describe later.

Honggfuzz is structure-unaware, meaning that it generates inputs which are simply raw byte sequences, and the test code itself is responsibility for converting that <code>&[u8]</code> seed into more structured data. Care must be taken to ensure that this interacts well with the employed mutation strategies - that small mutations of the input seed produce small changes in the structured data. For generating Wasm modules, this functionality is already offered by the <code>wasm-smith</code> crate, with configuration to enable or disable various Wasm features. To focus on vulnerabilities relevant to Soroban, we extended wasm-smith's configuration with an option to disable the generation of floating-point instructions and types, and this was later merged into wasm-smith v0.218.0.

With a basic harness set up, our strategy was then to continually refine these harnesses by repeating the following steps:

- 1. Start the fuzzer on the given harness, leaving it running continuously in the background.
- 2. While that long-running harness makes progress, repeatedly
 - 1. Inspect any code coverage and performance information.
 - 2. Based on the collected information, tweak the configuration or test code.
 - 3. Do a shorter fuzzing run to explore if the changes were beneficial, deciding whether they should be kept or reverted.

3. Once the long running harness fails to find any new interesting inputs over a large span of time, or if a significantly better configuration is found, switch the long-running harness to the new configuration.

This process ensures that our compute resources are fully utilized for the duration of the audit, enabling us to collectively perform a very large number of iterations, while still doing the exploratory work needed to achieve a high-level of effectiveness.

Platform Logic and Features Description

Wasmi is an efficient and lightweight WebAssembly interpreter with a focus on constrained and embedded systems. It relies on translating the stack-based Wasm bytecode to Wasmi's internal, register-based instruction set. Conceptually, the Wasmi processing pipeline thus consists of the following steps:

- 1. **Compilation**. Parsing the Wasm bytecode, validating the parsed module, and translating the parsed module into Wasmi's internal representation.
- 2. **Execution**. Interpreting a function compiled to Wasmi.

Compilation

During compilation, a Wasm module, represented as bytecode, is parsed, validated and translated into Wasmi's internal data structure for representing programs, called a code map (see CodeMap in Appendix: Engine Class Diagrams) that the execution phase interprets.

Parsing and validation relies on the external wasmparser-nostd crate, a fork of wasmparser.

Module compilation has the following steps:

- 1. Processing the module header.
- 2. Processing functions.
- 3. Processing the data section.

Module header and data section processing include parsing and validating the input payload by payload, then storing the processed data. In addition to validation as defined by the Wasm specification, Wasmi also enforces structural limits defined in its configuration, e.g. on the maximal number of global variables (see Config in Appendix: Engine Class Diagrams).

This is always done eagerly, i.e. when compiling a given module. However, Wasmi provides different compilation modes that enable processing functions lazily:

- 1. **Eager**. All functions are parsed, validated and translated eagerly.
- Lazy translation. All functions are parsed and validated eagerly, but translated lazily on first use.
- 3. **Lazy**. All functions are parsed, validated and translated lazily on first use.

Additionally, function validation may be skipped altogether in all compilation modes. The module parsing, validation and translation process is shown in detail (for the eager setting) in Appendix: Translation Sequence Diagrams.

During compilation, the code map is populated with FuncEntity instances. In eager mode, functions are translated into CompiledFuncEntity instances. Such an object stores all data, necessary to execute the given function, in particular, a sequence of Wasmi instructions. In lazy and lazy translation modes, a function is represented as an UncompiledFuncEntity that stores the byte code and the module header that enable translating (and optionally, validating) the function on-demand.

Translation Algorithm

Translation transforms a stack-based Wasm program into a register-based Wasmi program.

The function translator is implemented as a visitor over wasmparser 's instruction AST (i.e. implements the Visitoperator trait) that is invoked when an instruction is parsed. Hence translation is tightly coupled with the parsing process (as is validation). Throughout the translation process, several compiler optimizations are applied, e.g. constant propagation, peephole optimization, dead code elimination, and opcode fusion. After linearly processing each instruction, a finalization step is performed that resolves labels and consolidates the register space.

For a per-instruction description of the translation process, see Appendix: Algorithmic Description of the Translator.

Data structures used in the translation process are depicted in Appendix: FuncTranslator Class Diagrams.

Example

We're going to demonstrate the translation process on a simple example. Consider the following Wasm function:

```
func (param i32) (result i32)
  local.get 0
  if (result i32)
    i32.const 1
  else
    i32.const 2
  end
  return
end
```

When translating this function, as an initialization step, a new control frame for the function body is pushed onto the control stack (see ControlFrame and ControlStack in Appendix:

FuncTranslator Class Diagrams) that tracks information about the current control structure.

For example, a new symbolic label, say, Lo, is created and stored in the control frame to represent the jump location at the end of the function. Since the concrete address is not yet known, it will be resolved later when visiting the corresponding end instruction (and in some cases during the finalization step).

Next local.get 0 is processed, and a new tagged provider (wrapping the register storing the value for local 0, say, R0) is pushed onto the value stack (see TaggedProvider and ValueStack in Appendix: FuncTranslator Class Diagrams).

Next, if i32 is processed, and a new control frame is pushed which tracks the if with, among other things, labels for the end of the if-else block and the start of the else branch (say, L1 and L2, respectively). Since the if produces an i32 value, a new register, R1, is allocated to hold the result of the control structure. At the same time, the provider is consumed from the stack, and the first (albeit incomplete) instruction is generated using the instruction encoder (see InstrEncoder in Appendix: FuncTranslator Class Diagrams):

```
branch_i32_eq_imm R0 0 L2
```

encoding that, if register R0 is 0, then jump to the (yet unknown) destination L2 (the else branch), otherwise continue with the next instruction (the then branch).

Next, i32.const 1 is processed, which pushes the constant value 1 onto the value stack.

Next, else is processed, which marks (1) the end of the then branch (2) the start of the else branch. Accordingly, the value stack is popped and pushed, and label L2 is pinned.

Also, 1 is popped from the value stack, and two new instructions are generated:

```
copy_imm32 R1 1
branch L1
```

which writes the if -result into R1, then jumps after the if-else block.

Next, i32.const 2 is processed, which pushes the constant value 2 onto the value stack.

Next, end is processed, which marks the end of the if-else block. Accordingly, the control stack is popped, and L1 is pinned. Also, 2 is popped from the value stack and R1 is pushed onto it to produce the result of the if-else block, and a new instruction is generated:

```
copy_imm32 R1 2
```

which writes the else -result into R1.

Next, return is processed, which simply pops the value stack and generates

```
return_reg R1
```

Finally, end is processed, which marks the end of the function body, and the control stack is popped.

The following finalization step then resolves labels and jump offsets in instructions, thus the final Wasmi program is

```
branch_i32_eq_imm R0 0 3
copy_imm32 R1 1
branch 2
copy_imm32 R1 2
return_reg R1
```

Execution

Wasmi execution is relatively straightforward. For each function call, a call frame is pushed onto the call stack, and function local constants, function arguments, and function locals are allocated and initialized on the value stack, the execution-time equivalent of the class with the same name used for translation (see Engine Class Diagrams). The instructions stored in the code map are then interpreted, mutating the call and value stacks.

Continuing the example above, let's assume that the translated function has been called with an argument arg.

The function body instructions and their addresses are

```
Address Wasmi-Instruction

i branch_i32_eq_imm R0 0 3
i+1 copy_imm32 R1 1
i+2 branch 2
i+3 copy_imm32 R1 2
i+4 return_reg R1
```

- A CallFrame has been added to the *call stack*. It indicates where in the *caller's* register slots the single i32 result should be written (R3 for the sake of an example), and contains the instruction pointer of the code to execute (starting at address i), as well as offsets into the *value stack*:
- A "value frame" of size 2 has been added to the *value stack*. It contains the single i32 argument arg in register slot R0, and an additional register slot R1 to use in the function

body (initialised with 0).

• Both *frame offset* and *base offset* pointers in the CallFrame point to the register slot R0. If the function was using constants, they would be allocated before this slot (accessed with negative register numbers), and the *frame pointer* would point to the first constant.

Execution:

- Execution starts by reading the instruction at address i, which is branch_i32_eq_imm.

 This compound (fused) instruction compares the arg in register slot R0 to the immediate value 0 and performs a branch if the result is true.
- If the two values are equal (i.e., result 1 for true), the instruction pointer will be incremented by 3, and i+3 is the next instruction.
 - This instruction copy_imm32 will write 2 into the register slot R1. The value stack is then ... | arg | 2 |
 - i+4 is the next instruction
- If the values are not equal (i.e., result 0 for false), the branch is not taken, i+1 is the next instruction.
 - copy_imm32 will write 1 into the register slot R1. The value stack after this is
 ... | arg | 1 |
 - The next instruction branch increments the instruction pointer by 2, and i+4 is the next instruction.
- The return_reg in i+4 performs a function return with the value from R1
 - the value in R1 (either 1 or 2) is written to the target destination R3 in the prior value frame,
 - the value stack size is reduced to remove R0 and R1 of the finished call,

• and the call frame is popped from the call stack.

In order for execution to be as performant as possible, the executor intensively relies on unsafe functions. Safety of these calls mostly relies on correctness of the translation See Translation Output Validation for further details.

Code Review Discussion and Findings

This section communicates results, data, and findings of the code review performed over the duration of the audit. The code review was performed in accordance with section Methodology where analysis of the translator and executor were performed; as well as specific targeted inspection of each unsafe call.

The Wasmi codebase is generally well-organized, adheres to Rust best practices and contains informative doc comments in various places, as well as explanations for particular invariants which may be unobvious.

Findings presented in this section are issues that can cause the interpreter to fail, malfunction, and/or be exploited, and should be properly addressed. Informative findings presented in this section do not necessarily represent any flaw in the code itself. However, they indicate areas where the code may need external support or deviate from best practices.

Translator

We performed a best-effort code review of the Translator (under

crates/wasmi/src/engine/translator). Results are summarized in the following table.

File	Code Review Findings		
control_frame.rs	Informative findings		
control_stack.rs	No issues found		
driver.rs	Informative findings		
error.rs	No issues found		
instr_encoder.rs	Informative findings		
labels.rs	No issues found		
mod.rs	Informative findings, Missing copy in select translation		
relink_result.rs	Informative findings		
stack/consts.rs	Informative findings		
stack/locals.rs	No issues found		
stack/mod.rs	Informative findings		
stack/provider.rs	Informative findings		
stack/register_alloc.rs	Inconsistencies in RegisterAlloc Bounds		
typed_value.rs	No issues found		
utils.rs	No issues found		
visit_register.rs	visit_input_registers does not visit all registers of a RegisterSpan		
visit.rs	Informative findings		

Informative findings mentioned in this table include small inconsistencies, typos, code quality suggestions or other trivial issues in code or documentation. These have been reported directly to the Wasmi development team as soon as detected, and are not detailed further in this report.

Commits fixing informative findings:

- https://github.com/wasmilabs/wasmi/commit/c0f79e1f8ad38847023b72fea5a738ddca13167b
- https://github.com/wasmilabs/wasmi/commit/39414e86b75e25747d84204417c99ba2c970f373
- https://github.com/wasmilabs/wasmi/commit/efb0329b320278f46653c561ca0a2c1f47750a78

Executor

We established an overview of the Wasmi instructions in comparison to corresponding Wasm instructions. Then we inspected the implementation of each family of instructions, with a focus on potential problems caused by their use of unsafe Rust code.

unsafe Rust Code

Throughout the wasmi code base there are various usages of unsafe. Each of these usages expands the capabilities of Rust, and so weakens the safety guarantees typically enforced by the Rust compiler. The conventional way to ensure that a usage of unsafe Rust is safe is to check the safety invariants that the particular usage requires, and to write a Safety comment that details how the calling code / context upholds the invariants. As part of the audit we inspected many usages of unsafe Rust, focusing on the unsafe Rust usage in the engine and particularly executor (sub-)modules. Each inspection had a best effort to ensure that the Safety invariants are satisfied, and so no undefined behaviour could be expected to occur from these locations.

A table detailing the analysis can be found in the Appendix: unsafe Rust Checklist

[C1] CompiledFuncEntity can take more than u32::MAX entries

Severity: Low

Recommended Action: Fix Code Addressed by client

Description

Inside code_map.rs inside the engine module, the struct CompiledFuncEntity has a function new with a comment that indicates that the function should panic if called with instrs length greater than u32::MAX. However this is not enforced in the code, and testing verified it is possible to exceed the bound without triggering a panic.

Recommendations

Likely the best course of action is to add an assertion that triggers the panic. However if it is intended for this bound to be able to be exceeded then the comment should be removed. Furthermore, there should be an upper bound enforced that is consistent with Wasm.

Status

This issue is fixed on main by PR#1207

[C2] Inconsistencies in RegisterAlloc Bounds

Severity: Low

Recommended Action: Fix Code

Not addressed by client

Description

According to code inspection and discussions with the Wasmi development team, the dynamic and preservation space of registers satisfy the following invariants of RegisterAlloc:

```
dynamic(r): min_dynamic <= r < max_dynamic
preserve(r): min_preserve < r <= max_preserve</pre>
```

Relationship between max_dynamic and min_preserve

In order for the two register spaces to be distinct, max_dynamic <= min_preserve</pre> needs to hold. However, RegisterAlloc methods do not agree whether equality is allowed or not.

For example, push_dynamic() admits equality (it performs the check before applying the increment):

whereas push_dynamic_n does not (it performs the check after applying the increment):

```
wasmi-labs/wasmi/crates/wasmi/src/engine/translator/stack/register alloc.rs
Line 268 to 283 in 02621ad
              pub fn push_dynamic_n(&mut self, n: usize) -> Result<RegisterSpan, Error> {
    fn next_dynamic_n(this: &mut RegisterAlloc, n: usize) -> Option<RegisterSpan> {
        let n = i16::try_from(n).ok()?;
        let next_dynamic = this.next_dynamic.checked_add(n)?;
  268
  269
  270
  271
  272
                          if next_dynamic >= this min_preserve {
  273
                                return None;
  274
275
                          let register = RegisterSpan::new(Register::from_i16(this.next_dynamic));
  276
                          this next_dynamic += n;
  277
                          this max_dynamic = max(this max_dynamic, this next_dynamic);
  278
                          Some(register)
                    self.assert_alloc_phase();
next_dynamic_n(self, n)
    .ok_or_else(|| Error::from(TranslationError::AllocatedTooManyRegisters))
  280
  281
  282
  283
```

Uninhabitable register index

```
Even if max_dynamic = min_preserve is allowed, for r = max_dynamic = min_preserved, neither dynamic(r) nor preserve(r).
```

This can lead to spurious TranslationError::AllocatedTooManyRegisters errors:

Moreover, register_space() returns RegisterSpace::Dynamic for such a register:

```
wasmi-labs/wasmi/crates/wasmi/src/engine/translator/stack/register alloc.rs
Line 165 to 176 in 02621ad
            pub fn register_space(&self, register: Register) -> RegisterSpace {
    if register_is_const() {
 165
 166
 167
                      return RegisterSpace::Const;
 168
                 if self.is_local(register) {
 169
 170
                      return RegisterSpace::Local;
 171
                 if self.is_preserved(register) {
    return RegisterSpace::Preserve;
 173
 174
 175
                 RegisterSpace::Dynamic
```

Recommendation

Adjust the definition of the bounds so that the whole register space can be utilized. Document these invariants. Make sure checks for bounds are consistent.

Status

Acknowledged by client.

[C3] Underestimated Fuel Consumption of Table and Memory Instructions

Severity: Low

Recommended Action: Fix Code

(Not addressed by client)

Description

FuelCosts::cost_per uses a truncating u64 division to compute fuel amounts.

This may result in fuel_for_bytes and fuel_for_copies returning 0 (with the default cost of 8 registers (copies) per fuel and 64 bytes per fuel).

fuel_for_copies is used in several places. During the translation when generating Copy and Return instructions, a base fuel is added to account for the truncation

but several other call sites do not make this adjustment: the code to finalize function translation and for table-related operations don't adjust fuel.

fuel_for_bytes is only used in memory instructions. These instructions consume their fuel dynamically, without adjustment to account for the truncation. See MemoryEntity::grow for an example:

Recommendation

The most appropriate fix would be to modify the <u>costs_per</u> function such that it will round *up* instead of truncate the computed fuel value.

Status

Acknowledged by client

[C4] Large inputs to raw pointer functions may cause undefined behaviour depending on target

Severity: High

Recommended Action: Fix Code

Not addressed by client

Description

There are 4 calls to *mut or *const functions that have a common Safety comment. These calls are:

- engine/bytecode/instr_ptr.rs::InstructionPtr::offset calling <const* T>::offset with
 count: isize;
- engine/executor/stack.rs::FrameRegister::register_offset calling <mut* T>::offset with
 count: isize;
- engine/bytecode/instr_ptr.rs::InstructionPtr::add calling <const* T>::add with
 count: usize
- engine/executor/stack/values.rs::BaseValueStackOffset::stack_ptr_at calling <mut* T>::add
 with count: usize;

These calls in particular are common in that they both take an unbounded argument on the type that may violate the Safety comment of ():

```
/// * The offset in bytes, count * size_of::<T>() , computed on mathematical integers
(without
/// "wrapping around"), must fit in an isize .
```

```
egin{align*} let \ 	exttt{TYPE} &= 	exttt{InstructionPtr} | 	exttt{UntypedVal} \ & 	exttt{sizeof::<MAX} \ count \leq \lfloor rac{	exttt{isize::MAX}}{	exttt{sizeof::<TYPE>}} 
floor \ count \leq \lfloor rac{2^{n-1}-1}{8} 
floor \end{aligned}
```

$$count \leq \lfloor rac{2^{n-1}-1}{2^3}
floor$$

Calculating the maximum for **count** for each word size gives:

Case n = 8:

$$count \leq \lfloor rac{2^7-1}{2^3}
floor$$

 $count \leq 15$

Case n = 16:

$$count \leq \lfloor rac{2^{15}-1}{2^3}
floor$$

 $count \leq 4095$

Case n = 32:

$$count \leq \lfloor rac{2^{31}-1}{2^3}
floor$$

 $count \leq 268435455$

Case n = 64:

$$count \leq \lfloor rac{2^{63}-1}{2^3}
floor$$

count < 1152921504606846975

Case n = 128:

$$count \leq \lfloor rac{2^{127}-1}{2^3}
floor$$

 $count \leq 21267647932558653966460912964485513215$

n-bit	count max	count max as integer	u n ::MAX	i n ::MAX
n	<u>i<n>::MAX</n></u> 2 ³		2^n-1	$2^{n-1}-1$
8	18::MAX 2 ³	15	255	127
16	116::MAX 23	4095	65535	32767
32	132::MAX 23	268435455	4294967295	2147483647
64	164::MAX 23	1152921504606846975	18446744073709551615	9223372036854775807
128	1128::MAX 23	2126764793255865396646 0912964485513215	3402823669209384634633 74607431768211455	1701411834604692317316 87303715884105727

It is possible to overflow for all functions, as the input is unbounded isize for

InstructionPtr::offset and FrameRegister::register_offset , and the input is

unbounded usize for InstructionPtr::add and ValueStack::stack_ptr_at . With exception that FrameRegisters::register_offset is restricts offset to an i16 no matter the architecture.

Recommendations

There should be a guard to ensure that the maximum value is not exceeded. If this is a performance issue it should be on extra-checks option.

Status

Acknowledged by client. Furthermore, there is active development to add postconditions and extra checks into Wasmi in this PR.

[CI1] Best Practices and Notable **Particularities**

Severity: Informative Addressed by client

Description

Here are some notes on the protocol particularities, comments, and suggestions to improve the code or the design logic of the protocol in a best-practice sense. They do not in themselves present issues to the audited protocol but are advised to either be aware of or to be followed when possible, and may explain minor unexpected behaviors on the deployed project.

- 1. Panic comment on for engine/bytecode/utils.rs::from source to dst does not actually occur in code.
- 2. Magic numbers in engine/code map.rs::UncompiledFuncEntity::compile.
- 3. EngineFuncSpan relies on an invariant that start <= end, however it is possible to create an instance of this struct that violates that.
- 4. engine/executor/instrs.rs::get entity! macro matches on a function with parameter store: &StoreInner, however this parameter is unused.
- 5. The way the FunctionBody gets deconstructed in parse_buffered_code, and then reconstructed in FuncTranslationDriver::new appears inconsistent: While "eager" translation uses an offset which is obtained from the original FunctionBody, the "lazy" translation uses an offset of 0. The offset appears redundant.
- 6. The Sync instance for Arena<Idx, T> requires T to be Send (should be Sync). Given the instances used with Arena, this is without consequence at the moment.
- 7. Currently Wasmi is largely maintained by 1 person which presents a single point of failure. Should there be a pressing issue or update required of Wasmi and that person is unavailable, then it may be difficultly for other developers to address the issue.
- 8. In engine/executor/instrs/return .rs there are functions of the form execute_return* which execute instructions of the form Instructions::Return*. Many of the comments for these functions incorrectly label which instruction is being executed. Here is one example.

Recommendations

For each of the topics elaborated above, we recommend implementing the following approaches into the protocol's contracts:

- 1. Remove the comment, the client confirmed that the function should not panic if it would return BranchOffset(0)
- 2. Change these numbers to constants, or add them to the config.
- 3. Add a function to EngineFunc, end: EngineFunc) that constructs an EngineFuncSpan but with a guard that enforces start <= end. All constructions of EngineFuncSpan must happen through this function.
- 4. Remove the unused parameter
- 5. Investigate the de-facto value of the offset and remove it if redundant, possibly use original FunctionBody for translation.
- 6. Change T: Send to T: Sync
- 7. Increase the knowledge base of Wasmi to more people. A good start could be adding code review for PRs to Stellar / Soroban, so that they are now becoming increasingly familiar with the code as it evolves.
- 8. Correct the comments to the mislabeled instructions.

Status

- 1. Removed on main branch (v.0.37.0 and above)
- 2. Fixed on main branch PR#1239
- 3. Fixed on main branch PR#1239
- 4. Changed on main branch (v0.37.2 and above)
- 5. Fixed on main branch. PR#1241
- 6. Fixed on main branch PR#1239
- 7. Acknowledged. Furthermore, there are active efforts to increase the knowledge base of Wasmi to more people, and code review for Stellar / Soroban on PRs is considered.
- 8. Fixed on main branch PR#1239

[CI2] Results of cargo-audit

Severity: Informative Addressed by client

Description

Rustsec tool cargo-audit was run and returned two warnings (RUSTSEC-2024-0375, RUSTSEC-2021-0145) related to one crate atty which is unmaintaned. Recommended fix is to use std::io::IsTerminal for Rust version ^1.70.0. However this crate is a downstream dependency of wasi-cap-std-sync.

Recommendations

Change dependencies in such a way that avoids using the atty crate.

Status

This issue was already addressed by https://github.com/wasmi-labs/wasmi/pull/1140 for main and v0.37.0+. No fix is implemented for 0.36.x, however since this is a wasi dependency it should not affect Stellar / Soroban.

[Cl3] visit_input_registers does not visit all registers of a RegisterSpan

Severity: Informative

Recommended Action: Document Prominently

(Not addressed by client)

Description

The <a href="visit_input_registers" trait provides a way to visit, and potentially modify, the input register references contained in instructions. However, the implementation is incomplete because in case of a RegisterSpan, only the first register of the span is visited and modified. It is not possible in general to implement a complete solution for RegisterSpan because the length of a RegisterSpan (i.e., how many and which registers are in fact addressed by it) is not known from the data type alone, but determined by the context in which the RegisterSpan is used.

For the use case of *defragmenting* the preservation space, the <a href="visit_input_registers" implementation is sufficient because the entire register span will be moved when moving its first register.

The second call site of visit_input_registers, within encode_local_set, tries to determine whether a given register was used by an instruction. This will not detect usage when the given register is addressed as part of a RegisterSpan.

Recommendation

For future development on Wasmi, it should be documented that visit_input_registers is incomplete to avoid introducing bugs because of an assumption of completeness.

Status

Reported to the client, implications discussed. Because the given register is in the *preservation* space, it is believed that no cases exist where it could be part of a register span and therefore no fix is required.

[CI4] Missing copy in select translation

Severity: Informative

Recommended Action: Fix Code Not addressed by client

Description

The translation step for select relies on constant propagation to achieve an efficient encoding for the instruction.

For example, if the condition is a constant, then the selected value can just be pushed back onto the value stack. However, if the value is a dynamic or preservation register, in order to avoid overwriting the value later, a copy instruction is emitted (see Output mismatch between Wasmi and Wasmtime #2):

```
wasmi-labs/wasmi/crates/wasmi/src/engine/translator/mod.rs
Line 2209 to 2220 in 8a1c6d8
  2209
                                    // Case: constant propagating a dynamic or preserved register
might overwrite it in
                                              future instruction translation steps and thus we may
   2210
require a copy instruction
   2211
                                     to prevent this in on happened.
let result = self.alloc.stack.push_dynamic()?;
                                               to prevent this from happening.
  2212
                                     let fuel_info = self.fuel_info();
   2213
                                    self.alloc.instr_encoder.encode_copy(
   &mut self.alloc.stack,
   2214
   2215
   2216
                                         result
   2217
                                         selected
   2218
                                         fuel_info,
   2219
                                     return Ok(());
   2220
```

If the two values represent the same register, a similar optimization applies. In this case however, dynamic and preservation registers are not special cased, and no copy instruction is emitted:

```
wasmi-labs/wasmi/crates/wasmi/src/engine/translator/mod.rs
Line 2229 to 2235 in 8a1c6d8
   2229
                                  if lhs == rhs
                                       // # Optimization
   2230
   2231
                                       //
// Both `lhs` and `rhs` are equal registers
// and thus will always yield the same value.
self.alloc.stack.push_register(lhs)?;
   2232
   2233
   2234
   2235
                                       return Ok(());
```

Recommendation

It is not evident that this is a safe optimization. If it is, consider documenting it with comments. If it is not, the copy instruction should be emitted. Adding an assertion to enforce the desired behaviour is also recommended.

Status

Acknowledged by client.

Suggested Executor Assertions

Severity: Informative Not addressed by client

The execution of some of the Wasmi instructions relies on assumptions on the translator's instruction output.

In some of these cases, assertions could be inserted into the executor code to double-check that the instructions adhere to the expected invariants (if desired, such assertions can be implemented with debug_assert to avoid performance penalties in release builds).

Copying between registers, assuming no overlap

The CopySpanNonOverlapping and CopyManyNonOverlapping are intended to be used when it can be guaranteed that while copying the values, no register is read from that has already been written to before (assuming a forward traversal of the registers).

Assuming no such overlap between the source and target register sets, values are copied directly without a temporary buffer.

- For CopySpanNonOverlapping, the function has_overlapping_copies(_, _) can be used to ensure at runtime that this is respected by the generated code.
- For CopyManyNonOverlapping, each of the source registers would have to be checked individually, by keeping a record of registers that have already been written to (in the respective code, the span starting at results.head() up to the current result. A similar check is implemented in the translator).

These can also be implemented as static checks (see Translation Output Validation) because the registers involved in the **Copy** instructions are known after translation.

BranchTable instruction assumes a valid sequence of **Branch or Return instructions follows**

The implementation of BranchTable increments the instruction pointer by the index value, assuming that it will point to a Branch or Return instruction afterwards. This could be checked by confirming the type of the instruction that ip points to after the adjustment. It can also be a static check (see Translation Output Validation) because the maximal length is known statically.

Check InstructionPtr (and FrameRegister) range to (dynamically) protect against overflow

The offset and add methods to adjust the InstructionPtr require the caller to ensure that the resulting instruction pointer always remains within the bounds of the current function. This could be checked within those methods by storing the valid range (in the InstructionPtr itself or in function call frames). This will however have a performance penalty because of the high frequency of instruction pointer changes. Therefore a check of the translated code before execution, as described in Translation Output Validation, is preferable, especially because all call sites of InstructionPtr::add and InstructionPtr::offset have statically-known or bounded arguments.

Similarly, FrameRegister could store the range to ensure that register_offset function does not overflow or underflow.

Status

These assertions are acknowledged. However their inclusion may occur in one of two different configurations, extra-check, or translation post-conditions. These configurations aim to create a modular approach to including higher security guarantees. extra-checks will be optional on production code to include stronger guarantees that only incur an insignificant or minor overhead. translation post-conditions are exclusively for debug compilation as the checks will incur a high performance cost. PR#1233 has active development for translation post-conditions.

Translation Output Validation

Severity: Informative Not addressed by client

Many instruction implementations in Wasmi rely on assumed properties of the instruction sequence produced by the Wasm-to-Wasmi translator, which in turn relies on the Wasm bytecode being validated.

In order to ensure that the Wasmi bytecode does not crash during execution, some properties of the Wasmi bytecode could be double-checked. These properties can be either local to compiled (translated) functions, or refer to global properties that concern an entire *module* (including all its imports).

Instruction Sequence Validations

As soon as a Wasm function is *compiled* to Wasmi, its CompiledFuncEntity can be validated.

```
wasmi-labs/wasmi/crates/wasmi/src/engine/code map.rs
Line 710 to 722 in 02621ad
  pub struct CompiledFuncEntity {
    /// The sequence of [`Instruction`] of the [`CompiledFuncEntity`].
    instrs: Pin<Box<[Instruction]>>,
    /// The constant values local to the [`EngineFunc`].
    consts: Pin<Box<[UntypedVal]>>,
    /// The constant values local to the [`EngineFunc`] in total
                       The number of registers used by the [`EngineFunc`] in total.
  715
  716
  717
                       # Note
  718
                 /// This includes registers to store the numerical tocal constant
/// function parameters, function locals and dynamically used registers.
  719
                       This includes registers to store the function local constant values,
  720
  721
                 len_registers: u16,
  722
```

The sequence of <u>instrs</u> must have the following properties:

- 1. Some instructions require certain "instruction parameters" (encoded in the same Instruction type) to follow immediately. In turn, these instruction parameters (e.g., Const32, TableIdx, Register) never occur by themselves without preceeding context. Details are described in wasmi::bytecode::Instruction and in Appendix: Wasmi Instruction Set Overview .
 - This can be checked easily by a forward pass through the instruction sequence.

- 2. All instructions in the sequence should refer only to registers in the range allocated by alloc_call_frame, of length len_registers. However, registers are accessed using an offset of consts.len() from the (value) frame offset, i.e., accesses to constants inside a function use a negative register index (see ValueStack, StackOffsets and the sp: FrameRegisters field in Engine).
 - A forward pass through the instruction sequence can verify this for all instructions and instruction parameters that carry Register arguments.
 - However, instructions with RegisterSpan arguments will sometimes require consideration of the instruction context (e.g., CopyMany), as the *length* of the RegisterSpan is not part of this data structure.
 - For these instructions, the maximum register that is accessed typically depends on how many RegisterList, Register, Register2, or Register3 instructions follow. This requires reading ahead in the instruction sequence.
- 3. All branch targets must stay within the function's instruction sequence.

 The Wasm instruction set uses the concept of *structured control instructions* and implicit *labels* to specify branch targets for branch instructions. Wasmi translation resolves these labels to integer offsets from the current instruction pointer. The Wasm If instruction is also compiled to a (fused) Wasmi branch instruction. The generated offset s in branch instructions are not allowed to move the instruction pointer outside the range of the current function's instructions.
 - This can be implemented by a forward pass through the instructions considering the relative position of the instruction in the instrs array.
 - For each offset found in an instruction, offset + position must be between [0..instrs.len()].
 - Branch tables in Wasmi are built from sequences of branch instructions which do not require special treatment. The BranchTable instruction itself performs a forward jump of dynamic but bounded size and can be checked using the size bound.

Checking References to Wasm Store Objects Contained in Instructions

Besides these local properties, the instruction sequence contains references to objects from the Wasm store: tables, memories, data segments, globals, and other functions. In order to ensure

that no instruction crashes, it must be ensured that this store indeed contains the referenced entity for all relevant instructions:

- Table indexes within CallIndirectParams, TableSize, and of course TableIdx, must refer to existing tables;
- Data segment indexes within DataSegmentIdx and DataDrop, must refer to existing data segments;
- **Element segment indexes** within **ElementSegmentIdx** and **ElemDrop**, must refer to existing data segments;
- Function indexes within RefFunc , must refer to existing (compiled or uncompiled) functions.

These properties can be checked using the function's respective ModuleHeader.

```
wasmi-labs/wasmi/crates/wasmi/src/module/mod.rs
Line 68 to 86 in 02621ad
        pub struct ModuleHeader {
   inner: Arc<ModuleHeaderInner>,
   69
   70
71
        #[derive(Debug)]
         struct ModuleHeaderInner {
   74
              engine: EngineWeak,
              func_types: Arc<[DedupFuncType]>,
imports: ModuleImports,
   76
              funcs: Box<[DedupFuncType]>,
              tables: Box<[TableType]>
   78
              memories: Box<[MemoryType]>,
globals: Box<[GlobalType]>,
globals_init: Box<[ConstExpr]>,
exports: Map<Box<str>, ExternIdx>,
   80
              start: Option<FuncIdx>,
engine_funcs: EngineFuncSpan,
   83
              element_segments: Box<[ElementSegment]>,
   85
```

All indexed entities are already present in the module header, although they are *populated* during module instantiation. The Wasm validation already checks all entity indexes before translation to Wasmi, so checking the existence of respective entities in Wasmi data structures duplicates these checks.

Checking that function calls have the correct arity (arg. count)

call* instructions (and ReturnCall* variants for tail call optimization) provide function arguments in subsequent Register* instructions.

For each function call, it should be checked that the function is called with the correct amount of arguments. The amount of arguments (arity) cannot easily be determined from the CompiledFuncEntity. Besides the argument count, the len_registers includes both a (known) amount of constants (consts) and an amount of registers for internal use.

The actual arity is bounded by len_registers - consts.len() arguments are provided ensures that the call to copy_call_params (call.rs: 241) cannot overflow the allocated value stack frame.

More precise arity information could be obtained from the ModuleHeader, which contains the types of all functions in the module.

Status

Planned, Add debug post-conditions for Wasmi translation created.

Fuzzing Discussion and Findings

This section communicates specific results and findings for the fuzzing runs performed over the duration of the audit. The fuzzing was performed in accordance with description given in section Methodology - see there for a more in-depth explanation motivating our approach and goals for the fuzzing campaign. The end of this section contains detailed information about all identified issues.

Time and Compute Resources

Because fuzzing is a randomized, feedback-driven process which gives better results the more iterations are run, with modern fuzzing tools also able to scale near linearly with the number of available cores, additional compute power and time significantly increases the likelihood that a vulnerability is identified. Towards that end, we allocated two powerful 16-core / 32-thread machines for the fuzzing campaign:

- An AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X with 64GB of RAM
- An AMD Ryzen 9 7950X with 128 GB RAM

After an initial 1.5 week period spent familiarizing with the codebase, we ran fuzzers on these machines near continuously for the remaining audit duration, yielding approximately 13 machine-weeks of total fuzzing time. The actual total duration is likely higher, as we also performed numerous short exploratory runs on other machines while these longer-running fuzzers were still executing.

As described in Methodology, our approach focused on end-to-end testing of the entire interpretation pipeline for crash-freedom and conformance with other Wasm implementations, homing in on thoroughly testing a small number of targets rather than distributing compute resources too thinly. The table below provides the approximate machine-time spent on each target, with descriptions of each target provided in the following sections.

Target	Machine-Days	Version	Bugs
Translation	14	v0.36.0	1
Execution	26	v0.36.x	2
Execution	8	v0.37.x	2
Differential	30	v0.36.x	3
Performance	13	v0.36.x	0

Harnesses

For the standard, coverage-guided fuzzing which seeks to find interesting inputs by exploring as many control-flow edges as possible, we built off of Wasmi's existing harnesses.

As an initial test case to evaluate our machine configuration and choice of fuzzing toolings, we ran the Wasmi translator harness unmodified on both machines for approximately 1 week. This translator harness simply generates random Wasm modules and calls the translator on them, with no specific testing assertions other than the invariant that no crashes occur. While this did reveal one bug, we decided not to dedicate further time to this harness after this period because the other harnesses already adequately cover these same code paths, while also hitting the more unsafe -dense parts of codebase with the executor where vulnerabilities are likely to occur.

We then focused primarily on the two other harnesses, both of which generate a random Wasm module using wasm-smith then call each exported function:

- An executor harness, which makes no explicit test assertions, but which we compile with sanitizer instrumentation and debug assertions enabled to identify crashes, failed assertions, and memory safety violations.
- A differential fuzzing harness, which checks results against wasmtime as well as a prior stack-based version of Wasmi.

We iteratively refined these harnesses as described in Methodology, identifying the best configurations for both the harness and the fuzzing tool to achieve maximal coverage. This process is guided by intuition stemming from knowledge of the fuzzer internals, along with empirical testing using numerous shorter fuzzing runs to evaluate possible changes, noting factors such as the rate of coverage increase, the breadth of coverage (i.e. line and function-based coverage), the depth of coverage (i.e. branch and path-based coverage), and the time for each test iteration. Because of the exploratory nature and abundant number of shortly-tested variations, in lieu of specific quantitative data, we provide a qualitative account highlighting the most effective modifications found. These modifications have since been upstreamed into Wasmi.

The wasm-smith configuration controls which Wasm features are available when generating inputs from a given <code>&[u8]</code> seed, with parameters to set the minimum or maximum numbers of various syntactic elements. In the existing harnesses, reasonable defaults were set for this

configuration with all supported features enabled. One of the most effective changes we made was to instead switch to a swarm-testing approach, where the wasm-smith configuration is itself dynamically produced from the input seed rather than fixed across all inputs. With a fixed configuration, where all possible features are enabled, the numerous features compete against each other for limited space within a single generated input, leading to each individual feature only being exercised shallowly. With swarm testing, however, only a smaller subset of features is enabled at any given time. This allows each of those features to be more thoroughly represented within a single generated input, while the random selection of the enabled subset still ensures a breadth of feature coverage across multiple inputs.

In the original executor harness, each randomly generated function is always called with a value of 1 for every argument, with the client's hope being that mutation of the function body itself would provide sufficient coverage despite these statically fixed inputs. In practice though, we found that randomizing the inputs improved the overall coverage, both in terms of it's depth and the number of iterations required to discover deeper control-flow paths. Crucially, the arguments are generated using bytes from areas of the seed unconsumed by wasm-smith's generation process.

At a high level, the improvements here make sense because randomizing the arguments provides more opportunities for small mutations in the seed to produce correspondingly small changes in the interpreter control-flow, improving the fuzzer's ability to iteratively work towards producing edge-case inputs needed to hit deeper control flow paths. More explicitly, control-flow paths are often guarded by comparisons requiring a particular edge-case value - checksums, maximums, minimums, zeros, NaNs, etc. Honggfuzz attempts to find such values by recording the Hamming distance between arguments of each cmp assembly instruction, preferentially exploring inputs which shorten this distance for any particular cmp and thus are more likely to change the comparison result and any dependent control-flow. Although wasm-smith makes an effort to ensure small changes in the input seed produce small changes in the generated Wasm module, there are many cases where this fails in practice - altering a single decision point in the generation logic, e.g. the type of an argument, can radically alter the generated module. Speculatively, this makes honggfuzz's cmp feedback mechanism less effective, as the entire path leading to a particular cmp changes with each mutation if it is even reached at all, rather than allowing some mutations which keeping that path relatively fixed and only alter the data under comparison. By also randomizing the function arguments with the remaining unconsumed parts of the seed, some mutations end up fixing the generated function body and

only altering the generated argument value, still preserving the bulk of the interpreter controlflow while moving closer to the desired cmp result, making it easier to achieve greater coverage depth.

The original executor harness also relied on wasm-smith's <code>ensure_termination</code> functionality to prevent the generation of infinite loops, which we replaced with Wasmi's built-in fuel metering. This of course improved coverage for the fuel metering code, as well as iteration time due to a more efficient implementation, but interestingly, it also seemed to decrease the number of iterations needed to achieve a given level of coverage breadth. Speculatively, this is because <code>ensure_termination</code> only inserts fuel metering at function headers and loop bodies, so for a fixed fuel cost, more iterations are spent exploring seeds near a local-maxima wherein generating additional instructions in the un-metered, straight line sections of code marginally increases coverage or total instruction count (which is also considered as part of honggfuzz's metric) without actually building towards more interesting edge-cases. With Wasmi's built-in fuel metering, which instead applies a cost for each instruction, extending the straight line sections of code comes at the cost of reducing complexity elsewhere, making it less likely that fuzzers considered these inputs interesting

For the differential fuzzing harness, the original harness had nondeterministic failures where one of compared Wasm interpreters ran out of stack space or register allocations due to differing resource limits as permitted by the Wasm spec. This render the results uninteresting, as it's difficult to differentiate actual issues versus this sort of false positive. For our fuzzing campaign, we then modified the differential target to pass on these nondeterministic cases instead of panicking, isolating any panics to the cases where all of the executors finish successfully but have different outputs. We also modified the wasm-smith configuration for this target to generate Wasm modules that look like the kind of modules that will be accepted by the Soroban client, e.g. disabling multi-value support, floating points, threads, etc.

We additionally attempted to develop a performance-focused fuzzer, seeking to maximize execution-time-per-unit-fuel and identify possible DoS vectors. This included both a fairly simple modification to honggfuzz, swapping the order of consideration for instruction count versus coverage updates when selecting previously-run inputs as a base for new inputs, as well as a more involved custom fork of honggfuzz to develop an approach based on PerfFuzz. The latter PerfFuzz-inspired fuzzer is still under development, and unfortunately some bugs in the fuzzer implementation were not identified until after the runs performed for this audit, which likely invalidates the efficacy of those attempts. No new vulnerabilities were revealed by either of

these performance-based fuzzing efforts, although it must be emphasized that the experimental nature of this approach means that a lack of findings doesn't provide any guarantees regarding the absence of relevant issues.

Identified Issues

In the rest of this section, we present all the issues identified by our fuzzing runs. In total, we found 8 violations of expected behavior:

- 3 silently incorrect outputs
- 2 segfaults or memory corruption issues
- 1 hang
- 1 panic due to hitting code marked unreachable
- 1 failed debug assertion

For each issue, we report the versions of Wasmi that are affected, a brief description of the actual vs expected behavior, a test case which triggers the bug, as well as links to any fixes made by the client and the relevant releases. At the time of writing, all issues identified have been patched in the most recent v0.36.x and v0.37.x release.

As with other findings in this report, we include a severity level ranging from low to high. One subtlety worth highlighting is that a few of the identified issues require the reference-types or multi-value Wasm proposals, which are disabled by present-day Soroban. For these issues, if they are isolated and seem to fundamentally require the unsupported proposals, we assign low severity regardless of other considerations. However, if they instead seem to be indicative of a more general design risk, with a likelihood of there being yet-undiscovered analogous vulnerabilities which do not require the unsupported proposals, we assign a severity as if the issue applied to the Wasm MVP.

Note, however, that such issues marked low severity due to requiring reference-types or multi-value were still important to address. Soroban may decide to extend their supported Wasm features in the future as these proposals become more established, especially given that they were recently enabled by default for the Rust compiler's code generation.

[F1] Abort on realloc() due to faulty br_table optimization

Severity: High Addressed by client

Context

```
Version 0.36: v0.36.0 *, v0.36.1 ok, v0.36.2 ok, v0.36.3 ok, v0.36.4 ok, v0.36.5 ok
Version 0.37: v0.37.0 ok, v0.37.1 ok, v0.37.2 ok
```

A Wasm program causes Wasmi to abort during a realloc().

Program

realloc.wasm:

```
(module
  (func (;0;)
call 1
drop
    drop
     drop
     drop.
    drop
    drop
drop
    qrop
    drop
    call 0)
  (func (;1;) (result i64 i64 i64 i64 i64 i64 i64 i64 i64) (local i32)
     i64.const 0
     i64.const 0
    i64.const 0
  local.get 0
br_table 0 0)
(export "" (func 0)))
```

Behavior

```
$ wasmi_cli realloc.wasm
realloc(): invalid next size
Aborted
```

Status

Fixed for 0.36 versions with a646d27 included in release v0.36.1. Does not occur in 0.37 versions due to changes in the br_table encoding which inadvertently addressed the issue.

Severity

This issue is marked as high severity because:

- It is a critical memory error where the heap has been corrupted resulting in an out-ofbounds write.
- Although this particular issue is only reproducible with the multi-value proposal, which is
 disabled by present-day Soroban, it is indicative of a more generally risky design that is
 unrelated to multi-value .

Explicitly, one of the contributing factors for this issue is that RegSpan does not record its own length, requiring it to be maintained correctly elsewhere lest a memory error occurs. It's hard to guarantee no other similar vulnerabilities are present, and another issue related to this design was already discovered in visit_input_registers does not visit all registers of a RegisterSpan.

[F2] Translator debug assertion fired due to ref.is_null constant propagation

Severity: Low Addressed by client

Context

```
Version 0.36: v0.36.0 ♣, v0.36.1 oK, v0.36.2 oK, v0.36.3 oK, v0.36.4 oK, v0.36.5 oK

Version 0.37: v0.37.0 oK, v0.37.1 oK, v0.37.2 oK
```

Unreleased: b48685f

A Wasm program causes the type-checking debug assertion in TypedVal::i64_eq to fire.

Program

```
assert.wat:
(module
  (func (result i32)
    ref.null func
    ref.is_null
  )
)
```

Behavior

```
$ wasmi_cli --invoke '' --compilation-mode lazy assert.wat
thread 'main' panicked at wasmi-0.36.0/src/engine/translator/typed_value.rs:180:5:
assertion failed: matches!(self.ty(), < i64 as Typed > :: TY)
```

Status

Fixed for 0.36 versions with f09d121 included in release v0.36.1. Fixed for 0.37 versions with 78788f9 prior to the release of v0.37.0.

Severity

This issue is marked as low severity because:

- It only occurs with debug assertions enabled.
- Although the fired assertion does indicate an overlooked case in the design, the actual runtime behavior would still be correct if the assertion were simply removed.

Namely, the root cause is that <code>ref.is_null</code> delegates to the translation logic for <code>i64.eqz</code>, taking advantage of the fact that Wasmi serializes <code>null</code> as a 64-bit <code>0</code>. However, during constant propagation, this calls <code>TypedVal::i64_eq</code> which contains a strict type checking assertion requiring both sides to be a <code>ValType::I64</code> before comparing them as <code>Untyped</code>. The assertion fails because a <code>FuncRef</code> is not literally a <code>ValType::I64</code>, even though the actual comparison as <code>Untyped</code> would still be semantically correct.

[F3] Segmentation fault due to visit_input_regs bug

Severity: Low Addressed by client

Context

```
Version 0.36: v0.36.0 🐞, v0.36.1 🐞, v0.36.2 🐞, v0.36.3 🐞, v0.36.4 🐞, v0.36.5 🚾
Version 0.37: v0.37.0 ok, v0.37.1 ok, v0.37.2 ok
```

A Wasm program causes a segmentation fault during execution of table.get 0.

Program

```
segv.wat:
   (type (;0;) (func))
(func (;0;) (type 0)
(local i32)
       local.get 0
      i32.const 0
      local.set 0
      table.get 0
      drop
   (table (;0;) 1 2 funcref) (export "" (func 0))
```

Behavior

```
$ wasmi_cli segv.wat
zsh: segmentation fault (core dumped) wasmi_cli bad.wat
```

Status

The root cause is that visit_input_regs fails to visit the input register for Instruction:TableGet::index , so the preserved register input to Instruction::TableGet (index) is not defraged at the end of translation.

Fixed for 0.36 versions with 82c9388 included in release v0.36.5. Does not occur in 0.37 versions due to a refactoring which allows these visitors to be generated automatically, exactly to avoid this sort of bug.

Severity

This issue is marked as low severity because:

- It only occurs with the reference-types proposal, which is disabled by present-day Soroban.
- Although the issue is a critical memory error, it is an isolated typo with no indication of broader risk to the MVP or present-day Soroban.

[F4] Output mismatch between Wasmi and Wasmtime #1

Severity: Low

Addressed by client

Context

```
Version 0.36: v0.36.0 ★, v0.36.1 ok, v0.36.2 ok, v0.36.3 ok, v0.36.4 ok, v0.36.5 ok

Version 0.37: v0.37.0 ok, v0.37.1 ok, v0.37.2 ok

Unreleased: 1e5a4ba ★
```

A Wasm program behaves differently on the Wasmi register-based executor when compared to both the Wasmi stack-based executor and wasmtime.

Program

```
diff.wat
```

```
(module
  (func (export "") (param i32) (result i32 i32 i32)
    local.get 0
    local.get 0
    block (param i32 i32)
       local.tee 0
       block (param i32 i32)
       local.get 0
       local.get 0
       local.get 0
       br 2 ;; returns
    end
    end
    unreachable
)
```

Behavior

Wasmi and Wasmtime report different outputs.

```
$ wasmi_cli diff.wat 1
[0, 1, 1, 1]
$ wasmtime diff.wat 1
1
1
1
1
```

Status

Fixed for 0.36 versions with 415a919 included in release v0.36.1. Fixed for 0.37 versions with e9c6acf prior to the release of v0.37.0.

Severity

This issue is marked as low severity because:

- It only occurs with the multi-value proposal, which is disabled by present-day Soroban.
- It is an isolated issue with no indication of broader risk for to the MVP or present-day Soroban.

[F5] Output mismatch between Wasmi and **Wasmtime #2**

Severity: High Addressed by client

Context

```
Version 0.36: v0.36.0 🀞, v0.36.1 🐞, v0.36.2 🐞, v0.36.3 ok, v0.36.4 ok, v0.36.5 ok
Version 0.37: v0.37.0 🀞, v0.37.1 ok, v0.37.2 ok
```

A Wasm program behaves differently on the Wasmi register-based executor when compared to both the Wasmi stack-based executor and wasmtime.

Program

```
diff.wat:
```

```
(module
  ;; condition (i32.const 0);; case: true (i32.const 31);; case: false (i32.const 0);; condition (i32.const 1)
     (select)
     (i32.const 0)
    (i32.eqz (local.get 0))
(select)
```

Behavior

```
$ wasmtime diff.wat
warning: using
               `--invoke` with a function that returns values is experimental and may break
in the future
$ wasmi_cli diff.wat
```

Status

Fixed for 0.36 versions with 15a3802 included in release v0.36.3. Fixed for 0.37 versions with 8ed9469 included in release v0.37.1.

Severity

This issue is marked as high severity because it affects the Wasm MVP as supported by Soroban and can silently result in arbitrarily incorrect results.

[F6] Output mismatch between Wasmi and **Wasmtime #3**

Severity: High Addressed by client

Context

```
Version 0.36: v0.36.0 🀞, v0.36.1 🀞, v0.36.2 🀞, v0.36.3 ok, v0.36.4 ok, v0.36.5 ok
Version 0.37: v0.37.0 🐞, v0.37.1 🐞, v0.37.2 💽
```

A Wasm program behaves differently on the Wasmi register-based executor when compared to both the Wasmi stack-based executor and wasmtime.

Program

```
diff.wat:
```

```
(module
         (func (export "") (param i32) (result i32)
  (local.set 0 (i32.const 0))
  (local.get 0)
  (loop $continue
        (if (i32.eqz (local.get 0))
                                      (then
                                               (local.set 0 (i32.const 1))
(br $continue)
                  )
         )
```

Behavior

```
$ wasmtime diff.wat 1
$ wasmi_cli diff.wat 1
1
```

Status

Fixed for 0.36 versions with 5859e15 included in release v0.36.4. Fixed for 0.37 versions with ddc8e5e included in release v0.37.2.

Severity

This issue is marked as high severity because it affects the Wasm MVP as supported by Soroban and can silently result in arbitrarily incorrect results.

[F7] Executor hang on unreleased version due to copy_span bug

Severity: Low Addressed by client

Context

```
Version 0.36: v0.36.0 ok, v0.36.1 ok, v0.36.2 ok, v0.36.3 ok, v0.36.4 ok, v0.36.5 ok
Version 0.37: v0.37.0 ok, v0.37.1 ok, v0.37.2 ok
```

Unreleased: 17a4242

A Wasm program causes the executor to incorrectly hang, independently of fuel metering.

Program

Behavior

Wasmi v0.36.0 correctly reports an integer overflow

```
$ wasmi_cli --invoke '' --compilation-mode lazy --fuel 10000 hang.wat
Error: failed during execution of : integer overflow
```

but the same invocation hangs when tested on commit 17a4242.

Status

Does not occur in 0.36 versions. Fixed for 0.37 versions with 1e5a4ba prior to the release of v0.37.0.

Note that this bug only occurred mid-development and was never published in a released version of Wasmi.

Severity

This issue is marked as low severity because:

- It only occurs with the multi-value proposal, which is disabled by present-day Soroban.
- It is an isolated issue with no indication of broader risk for to the MVP or present-day Soroban.

[F8] Executor panic on unreleased version due to br_table_many bug

Severity: Low Addressed by client

Context

```
Version 0.36: v0.36.0 ok, v0.36.1 ok, v0.36.2 ok, v0.36.3 ok, v0.36.4 ok, v0.36.5 ok
```

Version 0.37: v0.37.0 ok, v0.37.1 ok, v0.37.2 ok

Unreleased: a101c50 🐞

A Wasm program causes the executor to panic.

Program

```
crash.wat:
```

```
(module
  (func (result i32 i32 i32 i32)
        i32.const 1
        i32.const 0
        i32.const 1
        i32.const 0
)
(func (export "") (result i32 i32 i32)
        (block (result i32 i32 i32) ;; label = @1
        i32.const 0
        call 0
        br_table 0 1 1
      )
)
```

Behavior

Wasmi v0.36.0 correctly runs the example

```
$ wasmi_cli --invoke '' --compilation-mode lazy crash.wat
[0, 1, 0, 1, 0]
```

but the same invocation panics with commit a101c50

```
$ wasmi_cli --invoke '' --compilation-mode lazy crash.wat
thread 'main' panicked at crates/wasmi/src/engine/executor/instrs/return_.rs:252:27:
internal error: entered unreachable code: unexpected `Instruction` found while executing
`Instruction::ReturnMany`: BranchTableTarget { results: RegSpan(Reg(6)), offset:
BranchOffset(3) }
```

Status

Does not occur in 0.36 versions. Fixed for 0.37 versions with cc02394 prior to the release of v0.37.0.

Note that this bug only occurred mid-development and was never published in a released version of Wasmi.

Severity

This issue is marked as low severity because:

- It only occurs with the multi-value proposal, which is disabled by present-day Soroban.
- It is an isolated issue with no indication of broader risk for to the MVP or present-day Soroban.

Appendix

This appendix contains additional technical documentation produced during the audit, as well as an overview of all unsafe Rust code inspected as part of the code review.

Appendix: Wasmi Instruction Set Overview

Wasmi Instruction Set Description

Source: Wasmi source code wasmi::engine::bytecode::Instruction (v0.36.0)

The instructions of Wasmi byte code are declared and described in the bytecode module. This is a reorganised overview of all instructions, categorised in a manner similar to how Wasm instructions are presented in the Wasm specification.

- Special purpose instructions not present in Wasm
- Numeric instructions
- Vector instructions: None
- Reference instructions
- Parametric instructions
- Variable instructions
- Table instructions
- Memory instructions
- Control instructions

Generally speaking, the Wasmi instruction set contains more variants of the instructions found in Wasm. These variants are needed because Wasmi uses *registers* for local variables; therefore many instruction exists in a variant for *immediate* values (constants) as well as with registers. Also, most instructions that manipulate data require source and destination registers as parameters.

Special-Purpose Instructions

Instruction Parameters for Other Instructions

Const32(value), I64Const32(value), and F64Const32(value) are used to provide 32 bit encoded constants (of type 132, 164, or F64, respectively) to preceeding instructions.

To pass a *list of registers* (of arbitrary length) to a preceeding instruction, the following instruction parameters are used:

Instruction	Contents
Register(r0)	1 register
Register2(r0,r1)	2 registers
Register3(r0,r1,r2)	3 registers
RegisterList(r0,r1,r2)	3 registers, indicating that more registers follow

In order to provide more than 3 registers, a number of RegisterList instructions is followed by a final Register, Register2 or Register3 one.

For indexes that refer to tables, data segments, or element segments, there are specialised instruction parameters:

Instruction	Contents
TableIdx(idx)	A table index, consisting of 4 8-bit unsigned integral numbers
DataSegmentIdx(idx)	A data segment index (32-bit unsigned integral number)
ElementSegmentIdx(idx)	A data segment index referring to an element segment

Copying and Filling Registers

Wasmi requires utility instructions to copy values between registers or write immediate values into registers.

These instructions typically use a RegisterSpan of contiguous registers as the copy target, unless it is a single register (ro).

Instruction	Description
Copy(r0,r1)	copies contents of r1 to r0
Copy2(span,r1,r2)	copies r1 and r2 to the given target span
CopyImm32(r0,value)	copies immediate 32-bit value to r0
CopyI64Imm32(r0,value)	copies immediate 32-bit value to r0 as an I64
CopyF64Imm32(r0,value)	copies immediate 32-bit value to r0 as an F64
CopySpan(span, span2, len)	copies len values from source span2 to target span
CopyMany(span,[r1,r2])	copies more than 2 registers (2 in instruction, more following) to target span . Must be followed by a <i>list of instructions</i> as instruction parameters

CopySpan and CopyMany also have variants CopySpanNonOverlapping and CopyManyNonOverlapping. These variants assume that the given target registers are not read (as source registers) after having been written to, when performing the copy operation in a forward pass through the spans.

Fuel Consumption (if enabled)

Wasmi supports measuring execution effort by a special instruction ConsumeFuel(fuel) which carries an unsigned 32-bit BlockFuel integral number, described as a resource measure of executing a *basic block*.

Numeric Instructions

As in Wasm, arithmetic and other numeric instructions are grouped by underlying *numeric types* (I for integral numbers vs. F for floating-point decimals), as well as by the respective size in bits (32 or 64 in the instruction set). This numeric type prefix can be I32, I64, F32 or F64.

Likewise, variants for signed or unsigned interpretation of the arguments exist equivalently to the ones in Wasm (infix s for signed or unsigned).

NB the description here is simplified in that it does not consider NaN or Infinity arguments. The full semantics of the operations on F32 and F64 when applied to NaN or Infinity values is intended to be the same as in Wasm but not reproduced here.

Comparison instructions take three arguments, commonly *registers* (denoted r0, r1, and r2 below). The return value is stored in r0.

132 and 164 comparisons have variants with 1mm16 suffix, which contain an immediate 16-bit encoded value instead of r2 to serve as the second argument.

Instruction	Description
I <size>32Eq(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 == r2 Variants: I <size>EqImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>32Ne(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 != r2 Variants: I <size>NeImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>32LtS(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 < r2 (signed) Variants: I <size>LtSImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>32LtU(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 < r2 (unsigned) Variants: I <size>LtUImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>32GtS(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 > r2 (signed) Variants: I <size>GtSImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>32GtU(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 > r2 (unsigned) Variants: I <size>GtUImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>32LeS(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 <= r2 (signed) Variants: I <size>LeSImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>32LeU(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 <= r2 (unsigned) Variants: I <size>LeUImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>32GeS(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 >= r2 (signed) Variants: I <size>GeSImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>32GeU(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 >= r2 (unsigned) Variants: I <size>GeUImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>

where <SIZE> is either 32 or 64.

For floating point decimals, there are no variants for immediate arguments and no unsigned interpretation exists. Consequently, there are fewer instructions.

Instruction	Description
F <size>Eq(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 == r2
F <size>Ne(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 != r2
F <size>Lt(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 < r2
F <size>Le(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 <= r2
F <size>Gt(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 > r2
F <size>Ge(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 >= r2

where <SIZE> is either 32 or 64.

Unary operations take two registers, r_0 and r_1 , as arguments, and store the return value in r_0 .

Instruction	Description
I <size>Clz(r0,r1)</size>	r0 <- amount of leading zeros in the binary representation of r1
I <size>Ctz(r0,r1)</size>	r0 <- amount of trailing zeros in the binary representation of r1
I <size>Popcnt(r0,r1)</size>	r0 <- amount of 1 s in the binary representation of r1

where <SIZE> is either 32 or 64.

Instruction	Description (simplified)
F <size>Abs(r0,r1)</size>	r0 <- absolute value of FP decimal value in r1
F <size>Neg(r0,r1)</size>	r0 <r1< td=""></r1<>
F <size>Ceil(r0,r1)</size>	r0 <- smallest integral number larger than FP decimal value in r1
F <size>Floor(r0,r1)</size>	r0 <- largest integral number smaller than FP decimal value in r1
F <size>Trunc(r0,r1)</size>	r0 <- r1 truncated towards zero
F <size>Nearest(r0,r1)</size>	r0 <- r1 rounded towards the nearest integral, preferring even numbers
F <size>Sqrt(r0,r1)</size>	r0 <- square root of value in r1

where <SIZE> is either 32 or 64.

Binary Operations take 3 registers arguments, commonly *registers* (denoted ro, r1, and below). The return value is always stored in ro.

As for the comparison operations, binary operations for integral numbers come with variants (with Imm16 suffix) where the register argument r2 is replaced by an *immediate* 16-bit encoded value. In addition, the variants with suffix Imm16Rev exist for the non-commutative operations, which replace the register argument r1.

Again, <SIZE> is either 32 or 64 in all tables in this subsection.

Instruction	Description
I <size>Add(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 + r2 Variants: I <size>AddImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>Sub(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 - r2 Variants: I <size>SubImm16Rev(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>Mul(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 * r2 Variants: I <size>MulImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>DivS(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 / r2 (signed truncated) Variants: I <size>DivSImm16(r0,r1,imm), I<size>DivSImm16Rev(r0,imm,r2)</size></size>
I <size>DivU(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 / r2 (unsigned truncated) Variants: I <size>DivUImm16(r0,r1,imm), I<size>DivUImm16Rev(r0,imm,r2)</size></size>
I <size>RemS(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 % r2 (signed truncated) Variants: I <size>RemSImm16(r0,r1,imm), I<size>RemSImm16Rev(r0,imm,r2)</size></size>
I <size>RemU(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 % r2 (unsigned truncated) Variants: I <size>RemUImm16(r0,r1,imm), I<size>RemUImm16Rev(r0,imm,r2)</size></size>

Instruction	Description
I <size>And(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 & r2 (bitwise) Variants: I <size>AndImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>0r(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 r2 (bitwise) Variants: I <size>OrImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>Xor(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 ^ r2 (bitwise) Variants: I <size>XorImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>

There are special *fused* instructions combining bitwise operations and test whether the result is zero:

Instruction	Description
I <size>AndEqz(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- 0 == r1 & r2 (fused & and test) Variants: I <size>AndEqzImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>0rEqz(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- 0 == r1 r2 (fused and test) Variants: I <size>0rEqzImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>
I <size>XorEqz(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- 0 == r1 ^ r2 (fused ^ and test) Variants: I <size>XorEqzImm16(r0,r1,imm)</size>

Instruction	Description
I <size>Shl(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 << r2 (logical) Variants: I <size>ShlImm(r0,r1,imm), I<size>ShlImm16Rev(r0,imm,r2)</size></size>
I <size>ShrU(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 >> r2 (logical unsigned) Variants: I <size>ShrUImm(r0,r1,imm), I<size>ShrUImm16Rev(r0,imm,r2)</size></size>
I <size>ShrS(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 >> r2 (logical signed) Variants: I <size>ShrSImm(r0,r1,imm), I<size>ShrSImm16Rev(r0,imm,r2)</size></size>
I <size>Rotl(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- bits of r1 rotated left by r2 mod <size> Variants: I<size>RotlImm(r0,r1,imm), I<size>RotlImm16Rev(r0,imm,r2)</size></size></size>
I <size>Rotr(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- bits of r1 rotated right by r2 mod <size> Variants: I<size>RotrImm(r0,r1,imm), I<size>RotrImm16Rev(r0,imm,r2)</size></size></size>

Instruction	Description
F <size>Add(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 + r2
F <size>Sub(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 - r2
F <size>Mul(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 * r2
F <size>Div(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- r1 / r2
F <size>Min(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- if r1 < r2 then r1 else r2
F <size>Max(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- if r1 < r2 then r2 else r1
F <size>Copysign(r0,r1,r2)</size>	r0 <- if sgn(r1) == sgn(r2) then r1 else r1 * (-1) Variant: F <size>CopysignImm(r0,r1,sign)</size>

Conversions between numeric types follow the respective Wasm instruction set.

Instruction	Description
I32WrapI64(r0,r1,r2)	r0 <- r1 mod 2^32
I64ExtendI32S(r0,r1,r2)	r0 <- r1 sign-extended to 64 bit
I64ExtendI32U(r0,r1,r2)	r0 <- r1 extended to 64 bit (prefixing zeros, no sign)
I <n>Extend<m>S(r0,r1,r2)</m></n>	r0 <- r1 sign-extended to <n> bits from Wasm "sign-extension" proposal</n>

where <N> is 32 or 64, <M> is 8, 16, or 32, and <N> > <M> .

Instruction	Description (simplified)
I <n>TruncF<m>S(r0,r1,r2)</m></n>	r0 <- trunc(r1) if in range [-2^(<n>-1)2^(<n>-1) - 1]</n></n>
I <n>TruncF<m>U(r0,r1,r2)</m></n>	r0 <- trunc(r1) if in range [02^ <n>-1]</n>
F <n>ConvertI<m>S(r0,r1,r2)</m></n>	r0 <- float(r1) (as defined in Wasm)
F <n>ConvertI<m>U(r0,r1,r2)</m></n>	r0 <- float(signed(r1)) (as defined in Wasm)
I <n>TruncSatF<m>S(r0,r1,r2)</m></n>	as I <n>TruncF<m>S but returns 0 for NaN and max/min value for infinity from Wasm "non-trapping float-to-int conversions" proposal</m></n>
I <n>TruncSatF<m>U(r0,r1,r2)</m></n>	as I <n>TruncF<m>U but returns 0 for NaN and max/min value for infinity from Wasm "non-trapping float-to-int conversions" proposal</m></n>

where <N> and <M> are 32 or 64.

Instruction	Description
F32DemoteF64(r0,r1,r2)	Double to Float conversion (maybe infinity)
F64PromoteF32(r0,r1,r2)	Float to Double extension (identical value)

Reference Instructions

Producing a function reference works as in Wasm:

Instruction	Description
RefFunc(r0,r1)	r0 <- ref r1

No **null** check exists for function references, as there is no stack (the value to check will be in a register).

Parametric Instructions

The Wasm drop instruction does not exist because no stack is managed. The select instruction exists in several variants which each require to appear in a certain context (of instruction parameters following).

A register or constant value must follow as a separate instruction parameter for the following two variants:

Instruction	Description
Select(r0,r1,r2)	r0 <- if r1 then r2 else <next> A Register or Const instruction parameter providing <next> must follow</next></next>
SelectRev(r0,r1,r2)	r0 <- if r1 then <next> else r2 A Register or Const instruction parameter providing <next> must follow</next></next>

For the Imm variants, the respective select instruction must appear *pairwise*, with two arguments each: one register argument ro, and one immediate argument imm. The arguments are indexed by instruction 1 or 2 below.

Instruction	Description
SelectImm32(r0,imm)	$r\theta(1) \leftarrow if \ r\theta(2) \ then \ imm(1) \ else \ imm(2) \ imm(_) \ are immediate 32-bit integers.$
SelectI64Imm32(r0,imm)	$r\theta(1) \leftarrow if \ r\theta(2) \ then \ imm(1) \ else \ imm(2) \ imm(_) \ are immediate 64-bit integers that fit into 32 bit.$
SelectF64Imm32(r0,imm)	$r\theta(1) < -$ if $r\theta(2)$ then imm(1) else imm(2) imm(_) are immediate 64-bit floats that fit into 32 bit.

Variable Instructions

In Wasmi, local variables are held in registers. Therefore, get and set for variables only apply to *global* variables (of initialised modules).

Instruction	Description
GlobalGet(r0,r1)	r0 <- value of global variable at r1
GlobalSet(r0,r1)	Set global variable at r0 to value in r1 Variants: GlobalSetI32Imm16(r0,imm), GlobalSetI64Imm16(r0,imm)

Table Instructions

In comparison to Wasm, the Wasmi **table element access** instructions are similar but require the table index to be provided in a subsequent instruction parameter.

Instruction	Description
TableGet(r0,r1)	reads table tidx at index in r1 into r0 An instruction parameter TableIdx tidx must follow
TableGetImm(r0,idx)	reads table tidx at index idx into r0 An instruction parameter TableIdx tidx must follow
TableSet(r0,r1)	writes value in r1 into table tidx at index in r0 An instruction parameter TableIdx tidx must follow
TableSetAt(idx,r1)	writes value in r1 into table tidx at index idx An instruction parameter TableIdx tidx must follow
TableSize(r0,tidx)	stores size of table tidx in r0

TableGetImm and TableSetAt contain an immediate index idx, while TableGet and TableSet provide the index in a register argument.

There are a number of variants for **copying, filling, and initialising tables**.

TableCopy* instructions copy data between tables. All variants use three arguments dst, src, and len and additional instruction parameters for destination and source of the copy. They vary in whether arguments are registers or constant (16-bit encoded) values.

Instruction	Description
TableCopy(r0,r1,r2)	copies *r2 (len) many values from table srcTidx starting at index in r1 to table destTidx starting at index in r0 Two TableIdx instruction parameters for destTidx and srcTidx must follow
TableCopyTo(dst,r1,r2)	copies *r2 (len) many values from table srcTidx starting at index in r1 to table destTidx starting at index dst Two TableIdx instruction parameters for destTidx and srcTidx must follow
TableCopyFrom(rθ, src, r2)	copies *r2 (len) many values from table srcTidx starting at index src to table destTidx starting at index in r0 Two TableIdx instruction parameters for destTidx and srcTidx must follow
TableCopyFromTo(dst,src,r2)	copies *r2 (len) many values from table srcTidx starting at index src to table destTidx starting at index dst Two TableIdx instruction parameters for destTidx and srcTidx must follow
TableCopyExact(r0,r1,len)	copies len many values from table srcTidx starting at index in r1 to table destTidx starting at index in r0 Two TableIdx instruction parameters for destTidx and srcTidx must follow
TableCopyToExact(dst,r1,len)	copies len values from table <pre>srcTidx</pre> starting at index in r1 to table destTidx starting at index dst Two TableIdx instruction parameters for destTidx and srcTidx must follow
TableCopyFromExact(r0,src,len)	copies len values from table srcTidx starting at index src to table destTidx starting at index in r0 Two TableIdx instruction parameters for destTidx and srcTidx must follow
TableCopyFromToExact(dst,src,len)	copies len values from table srcTidx starting at index src to table destTidx starting at index dst Two TableIdx instruction parameters for destTidx and srcTidx must follow

As in Wasm, TableInit* instructions copy data from an element segment to a table. Like TableCopy, all TableInit* instructions have dst, src, and len arguments and differ in which ones are provided as registers or as (16-bit encoded) constants. TableInit* instructions require a destination TableIdx and a source ElementIdx instruction parameter to follow.

Instruction	Description
TableInit(r0,r1,r2)	copies *r2 (len) many values from segment srcEidx starting at index in r1 to table destTidx starting at index in r0 A TableIdx destTidx and an ElementIdx srcEIdx instruction must follow
TableInitTo(dst,r1,r2)	copies *r2 (len) many values from segment srcEidx starting at index in r1 to table destTidx starting at index dst A TableIdx destTidx and an ElementIdx srcEIdx instruction must follow
TableInitFrom(rθ, src, r2)	copies *r2 (len) many values from segment srcEidx starting at index src to table destTidx starting at index in r0 A TableIdx destTidx and an ElementIdx srcEIdx instruction must follow
TableInitFromTo(dst,src,r2)	copies *r2 (len) many values from segment srcEidx starting at index src to table destTidx starting at index dst A TableIdx destTidx and an ElementIdx srcEIdx instruction must follow
TableInitExact(r0,r1,len)	copies len many values from segment srcEidx starting at index in r1 to table destTidx starting at index in r0 A TableIdx destTidx and an ElementIdx srcEIdx instruction must follow
TableInitToExact(dst,r1,len)	copies len values from segment srcEidx starting at index in r1 to table destTidx starting at index dst A TableIdx destTidx and an ElementIdx srcEIdx instruction must follow
TableInitFromExact(r0,src,len)	copies len values from segment srcEidx starting at index src to table destTidx starting at index in r0 A TableIdx destTidx and an ElementIdx srcEIdx instruction must follow
TableInitFromToExact(dst,src,len)	copies len values from segment srcEidx starting at index src to table destTidx starting at index dst A TableIdx destTidx and an ElementIdx srcEIdx instruction must follow

TableFill instructions use arguments dst , len , and value . The value to fill in is always provided in a register, while dst and len may be either from registers or as constants. Again, a TableIdx must follow to indicate the table to modify.

Instruction	Description
TableFill(r0,r1,r2)	writes value in r2 *r1 (len) many times into table tidx, starting at index in r0 A TableIdx tidx instruction parameter must follow
TableFillAt(dst,r1,r2)	writes value in r2 *r1 (len) many times into table tidx, starting at index dst A TableIdx tidx instruction parameter must follow
TableFillExact(r0,len,r2)	writes value in r2 len many times into table tidx, starting at index in r0 A TableIdx tidx instruction parameter must follow
TableFillAtExact(dst,len,r2)	writes value in r2 len many times into table tidx, starting at index dst A TableIdx tidx instruction parameter must follow

The TableGrow instructions enlarge a table and return the old table size (or -1) in the first argument register (r0). The size to grow by is either from argument register r1 or immediate, the value to fill new cells with is provided in register r2.

Instruction	Description
TableGrow(r0,r1,r2)	Enlarges table tidx by size in r1, filling with value from r2. Returns previous size in r0 (or -1 on errors) A TableIdx tidx instruction parameter must follow
TableGrowImm(r0,sz,r2)	Enlarges table tidx by sz , filling with value from r2 . Returns previous size in r0 (or -1 on errors) A TableIdx tidx instruction parameter must follow

In Wasm, *element segments* in a module may be dropped to prevent further use (as a hint for possible optimisations). Correspondingly, Wasmi provides an instruction **Elemprop** which carries an element/data segment index and discards the indicated segment.

Memory Instructions

Load instructions access memory at a given offset and load bytes representing a value of the target type (132 , 164 , F32 , F64) into the argument register (here r0). The 2nd argument may be a register (in which case a Const32 instruction must follow to provide an offset value), or a constant offset. In the Offset16 variant, a 3rd argument provides a constant offset which must be representable in 16 bits, from a register (2nd argument).

Instruction	Description
<type>Load(r0,r1)</type>	r0 <- value loaded from r1 + <offset> A Const32 <offset> instruction parameter must follow</offset></offset>
<type>LoadAt(r0,offset)</type>	ro <- value loaded from given offset (2nd arg.)
<type>LoadOffset16(r0,r1, offset)</type>	r0 <- value loaded from r1 + offset (2nd/3rd arg.)

where <TYPE> is I32, I64, F32, or F64.

For I32 and I64 loads, additional instructions (equivalent to the ones in Wasm) exist to load fewer bytes and extend the value's bit pattern appropriately (unsigned or signed as per u or s after <M>).

Instruction	Description
I <n>Load<m>u</m></n>	as above, but reading <m> bits A Const32 <offset> instruction parameter must follow</offset></m>
I <n>Load<m>s</m></n>	as above, but reading <m> bits, sign-extending A Const32 <offset> instruction parameter must follow</offset></m>
I <n>Load<m>uAt</m></n>	as above, but reading <>>> bits
I <n>Load<m>sAt</m></n>	as above, but reading <m> bits, sign-extending</m>
I <n>Load<m>u0ffset16</m></n>	as above, but reading
I <n>Load<m>s0ffset16</m></n>	as above, but reading <m> bits, sign-extending</m>

where $\langle N \rangle$ is 32 or 64, and $\langle M \rangle$ is 8, 16, or 32 (if $\langle N \rangle$ is 64).

For **Store instructions**, the two arguments **ro** and **offset** define the place to store. There are 5 variants that differ in:

- how the stored value is specified:
 - either in a following Register instruction parameter,
 - or as a register within the same instruction (limiting the size of offset to 16 bit)
 - or as a 16-bit encoded value within the same instruction (limiting the size of offset to 16 bit).
- whether the target address is constant
 - the target address can be in a register, combined with a given offset,
 - or given as a constant (in the for StoreAt variants).

Instruction	Description
<type>Store(r0, offset)</type>	store value in r1 at address r0 + <offset> A Register <r1> instruction parameter must follow</r1></offset>
<type>StoreOffset16(r0,r1,offset)</type>	store value in r1 at address r0 + <offset></offset>
<type>StoreOffset16Imm16(r0,value,offset)</type>	store value at address r0 + offset
<type>StoreAt(addr,reg)</type>	store value from reg at addr
<type>StoreAtImm16(addr,value)</type>	store value at addr

where <TYPE> is I32, I64, F32, or F64.

For the integral types, there are variants for storing smaller values (of 8 or 16 bit width for 132 and 8, 16, or 32 bit width for 164), each with similar variants as the ones described above.

Instruction	Description
I <n>Store<m>(r0,offset)</m></n>	as above, but truncating the value to bits A Register r instruction parameter must follow
I <n>Store<m>Offset16(r0,r1,offset)</m></n>	as above, but truncating the value to bits
I <n>Store<m>Offset16Imm16(r0, value, offset)</m></n>	as above, but truncating the value to bits
I <n>Store<m>At(addr,reg)</m></n>	as above, but truncating the value to bits
I <n>Store<m>AtImm16(addr, value)</m></n>	as above, but truncating the value to bits

where $\langle N \rangle$ is 32 or 64, and $\langle M \rangle$ is 8, 16, or 32 (if $\langle N \rangle$ is 64).

Store instructions for floating-point decimals come in similar variants but without the immediate value variants.

Instruction	Description
F <n>Store(r0,offset)</n>	store value in r1 at address r0 + <offset> A Register <r1> instruction parameter must follow</r1></offset>
F <n>StoreOffset16(r0,r1,offset)</n>	store value in r1 at address r0 + <offset> The offset is small (16 bit)</offset>
F <n>StoreAt(addr, r1)</n>	store value in r1 at addr

where $\langle N \rangle$ is 32 or 64.

Memory management and initialisation instructions in Wasmi have different variants according to how the arguments are provided (in registers or as immediate values). No instruction parameters are required because Wasm (currently) limits each module's memories to exactly one.

Instruction	Description
MemorySize(r0)	ro <- current size of memory (in 64K pages)
MemoryGrow(r0,r1)	grow memory by size in r1 , return old size in r0
MemoryGrowBy(r0,sz)	grow memory by sz , return old size in ro

Instruction	Description
MemoryCopy(r0,r1,r2)	copies len bytes from mem[src] to mem[dst] len in r2, src in r1, dst in r0
MemoryCopyTo(dst,r1,r2)	<pre>copies len bytes from mem[src] to mem[dst] len in r2, src in r1</pre>
MemoryCopyFrom(rθ,src,r2)	<pre>copies len bytes from mem[src] to mem[dst] len in r2, dst in r0</pre>
MemoryCopyFromTo(dst,src,r2)	copies len bytes from mem[src] to mem[dst] len in r2
MemoryCopyExact(r0,r1,len)	<pre>copies len bytes from mem[src] to mem[dst] src in r1, dst in r0</pre>
MemoryCopyToExact(dst,r1,len)	copies len bytes from mem[src] to mem[dst] src in r1
MemoryCopyFromExact(r0,src,len)	copies len bytes from mem[src] to mem[dst] dst in r0
MemoryCopyFromToExact(dst,src,len)	copies len bytes from mem[src] to mem[dst]

Instruction	Description
MemoryFill(r0,r1,r2)	writes 8-bit val into mem[dstdst+len] val in r1, len in r2, dst in r0
MemoryFillAt(dst,r1,r2)	<pre>writes 8-bit val into mem[dstdst+len] val in r1, len in r2</pre>
MemoryFillImm(r0,val,r2)	writes 8-bit val into mem[dstdst+len] len in r2, dst in r0
MemoryFillExact(r0,r1,len)	writes 8-bit val into mem[dstdst+len] val in r1, dst in r0
MemoryFillAtImm(dst,val,r2)	writes 8-bit val into mem[dstdst+len] len in r2
MemoryFillAtExact(dst,r1,len)	writes 8-bit val into mem[dstdst+len] val in r1
MemoryFillImmExact(r0,val,len)	<pre>writes 8-bit val into mem[dstdst+len] val in r1 , len in r2</pre>
MemoryFillAtImmExact(dst,val,len)	writes 8-bit val into mem[dstdst+len]

The MemoryInit family of instructions copy data from a given data segment to memory, therefore a DataSegmentIdx must follow to indicate which segment to use.

Instruction	Description
MemoryInit(r0,r1,r2)	for data segment index dseg , copies data[dseg][srcsrc+len] to mem[dstdst+len] dst in r0 , src in r1 , len in r2 A DataSegmentIdx dseg instruction parameter must follow
MemoryInitTo(dst,r1,r2)	for data segment index dseg , copies data[dseg][srcsrc+len] to mem[dstdst+len] src in r1 , len in r2 A DataSegmentIdx dseg instruction parameter must follow
MemoryInitFrom(r0,src,r2)	for data segment index dseg , copies data[dseg][srcsrc+len] to mem[dstdst+len] dst in r0 , len in r2 A DataSegmentIdx dseg instruction parameter must follow
MemoryInitFromTo(dst,src,r2)	for data segment index dseg , copies data[dseg][srcsrc+len] to mem[dstdst+len] len in r2 A DataSegmentIdx dseg instruction parameter must follow
MemoryInitExact(r0,r1,len)	for data segment index dseg , copies data[dseg][srcsrc+len] to mem[dstdst+len] dst in r0 , src in r1 A DataSegmentIdx dseg instruction parameter must follow
MemoryInitToExact(dst,r1,len)	for data segment index dseg , copies data[dseg][srcsrc+len] to mem[dstdst+len] src in r1 A DataSegmentIdx dseg instruction parameter must follow
MemoryInitFromExact(r0,src,len)	for data segment index dseg , copies data[dseg][srcsrc+len] to mem[dstdst+len] dst in r0 A DataSegmentIdx dseg instruction parameter must follow
MemoryInitFromToExact(dst,src,len)	for data segment index dseg , copies data[dseg] [srcsrc+len] to mem[dstdst+len] a DataSegmentIdx dseg instruction parameter must follow

As in Wasm, data segments can be *dropped* to prevent further access (enabling optimisations) using the Wasmi instruction <code>DataDrop</code>, which carries a data segment index.

Control Instructions

The Trap instruction does what its name suggests: Execution fails with the given "trap code" indicating an error condition.

A wide variety of **branching instructions** exist in the Wasmi instruction set. A common trait to all of them is that they operate using an *offset* from the current instruction pointer (IP) rather than the nesting levels that Wasm uses in its respective **br** instruction.

Instruction	Description
Branch(offset)	modifies instruction pointer by adding offset

Many branch instructions were added to combine certain tests with a subsequent conditional branch on the result. Each of these instructions has either two argument registers and one (16-bit) offset, or one argument register, one (16-bit-encoded) immedate value argument, and one (16-bit) offset.

Instruction	Description
Branch <type><0P>(r0,r1,offset)</type>	adds offset to IP if r0 <0P> r1
Branch <type><0P>Imm(r0,val,offset)</type>	adds offset to IP if r0 <0P> val

where <TYPE> and <OP> are a type and a binary operation from the table below:

OP	Description	Types
And	bit-wise &	132
0r	bit-wise	132
Xor	bit-wise ^ (xor)	132
AndEqz	bit-wise & followed by comparing to zero	132
0rEqz	bit-wise followed by comparing to zero	132
XorEqz	bit-wise ^ followed by comparing to zero	132
Eq	== unsigned	I32 , I64
Ne	!= unsigned	I32 , I64
Lts	< signed	I32 , I64
LtU	< unsigned	I32 , I64
LeS	<= signed	I32 , I64
LeU	<= unsigned	I32 , I64
GtS	> signed	I32 , I64
GtU	> unsigned	132 , 164
GeS	>= signed	132 , 164
GeU	>= unsigned	I32 , I64

(Note the absense of And, Or, and Xor variants for 164).

For floating-point decimals, there are no immediate variants (and no signedness).

Instruction	Description
Branch <type><0P>(r0,r1,offset)</type>	adds offset to IP if r0 <0P> r1

OP	Description	Types
Eq	==	F32 , F64
Ne	!=	F32 , F64
Lt	<	F32 , F64
Le	<=	F32 , F64
Gt	>	F32 , F64
Ge	>=	F32 , F64

All these instructions rely on a special encoding with a 16-bit offset.

For cases where the offset is too large to be encoded as a 16-bit value, a generic fall-back instruction exists, which encodes the offset (32-bit) and the operation to perform as a special combined param (eter), read from a third argument register (r2) of the instruction.

Instruction	Description
BranchCmpFallback(r0,r1,r2)	adds offset to IP if r0 <0P> r1 offset and <0P> read from a parameter param passed in a third register argument

For multi-target branches, (Wasm instruction <code>br_table</code>), Wasmi uses the <code>BranchTable</code> instruction. This instruction in Wasmi contains the scrutinee register and the length of the branch table as arguments, and expects the respective following instructions (after an optional <code>copy*</code> instruction) to be <code>Branch</code> or <code>Return*</code> instructions that constitute the branch table (appropriate amount indicated by the length, including the default).

Instruction	Description
BranchTable(index,len_targets)	selects branch/return instruction indicated by value in index register, from len_targets branch or return instructions that follow Next len_targets instructions expected to be Branch or Return * (includes default if index value out of range).

All **function call instructions** Call* have a register span results (of unknown length) to indicate where the function results should be stored. Functions are either referred-to by their function index <code>func</code>, or called *indirectly through a table*, indicating the function type by an index <code>func_type</code> into the surrounding module's known types. Wasmi distinguishes internal functions from imported ones, and uses special <code>Call*</code> variants (suffixed with <code>0</code>) for functions without arguments. If arguments are required, they are passed as a register list that *follows* the <code>Call*</code> instruction.

Instruction	Description
CallInternal0(results, func)	Calls an internal function (by index func) without arguments
CallInternal(results, func)	Calls an internal function (by index func) Followed by a register list for the arguments
CallImported0(results, func)	Calls an imported function without arguments
CallImported(results, func)	Calls an imported function (by index func) Followed by a register list for the arguments
CallIndirect0(results, func_type)	Calls a function indirectly through a table, without arguments. Followed by CallIndirectParams (or Imm16 variant)
CallIndirect(results, func_type)	Calls an function indirectly through a table. Followed by CallIndirectParams (or Imm16 variant), and a register list for the arguments

The indirect call uses the following instruction parameters to supply the table and index for the indirect call:

Instruction	Description
CallIndirectParams(tIdx, reg)	holds a table index tIdx and a register reg containing an index
CallIndirectParamsImm16(tIdx,index)	holds a table index tIdx and a 16-bit index

For tail-call optimisation, there are special ReturnCall* variants corresponding to the above instructions, which reuse the prior function call's results registers:

Instruction	Description
ReturnCallInternal0(func)	tail-call internal function (by index func) without arg.s
ReturnCallInternal(func)	tail-call internal function (by index func). Followed by a register list for the arguments
ReturnCallImported0(func)	tail-call imported function (by index func) without arg.s
ReturnCallImported(func)	tail-call imported function (by index func). Followed by a register list for the arguments
ReturnCallIndirectO(func_type)	tail-call a function from a table without arg.s. Followed by CallIndirectParams (or ~Imm16 variant)
ReturnCallIndirect(func_type)	tail-call a function from a table. Followed by CallIndirectParams (or ~Imm16 variant) and then a register list for the arg.s

For **returning from function calls**, variants exist to return a number of immediate values or registers.


Instruction	Description
Return	Returns from a function without return value
ReturnReg(r0)	Returns value in register ro
ReturnReg2([r0,r1])	Returns values in registers ro and r1
ReturnReg3([r0,r1,r2])	Returns values in registers r0, r1, and r2
ReturnImm32(value)	Returns an immediate I32 constant value
ReturnI64Imm32(value)	Returns an immediate 164 constant value encoded in 32 bit
ReturnF64Imm32(value)	Returns an immediate F64 constant value encoded in 32 bit
ReturnSpan(iter)	Returns more than 3 registers, given as a register span iterator iter
ReturnMany(r0,r1,r2)	Returns more than 3 registers, r0 , r1 , r2 , and the ones from a following register list


A special *conditional return* instruction (with the same variants as above) exists, which only returns if a given condition register contains a non-zero value.


Instruction	Description
ReturnNez(r0)	If ro contains non-zero, returns from a function without return value
ReturnNezReg(r0,r1)	If ro contains non-zero, returns value in r1
ReturnNezReg2(r0,r1,r2)	If r0 contains non-zero, returns values in registers r0 and r1
ReturnNezImm32(r0,val)	If ro contains non-zero, returns an immediate I32``constant val`
ReturnNezI64Imm32(r0,val)	If ro contains non-zero, returns an immediate I64 val encoded in 32 bit
ReturnNezF64Imm32(r0,val)	If ro contains non-zero, returns an immediate F64 val encoded in 32 bit
ReturnNezSpan(r0,iter)	If $r\theta$ contains non-zero, returns more than 2 registers, given as an iterator iter
ReturnNezMany(r0,[r1,r2])	If r_0 contains non-zero, returns more than 2 registers, r_1 , r_2 , and the ones following in a register list


Note the absense of a variant with 3 registers (one register is needed for the r0).

Appendix: Engine Class Diagrams









Appendix: FuncTranslator Class Diagrams

FuncTranslator

func: FuncIdx engine: Engine

module: ModuleHeader

reachable: bool

«Option<_>» fuel_costs

alloc

FuelCosts

base: u64

copies_per_fuel: NonZero<u64> bytes_per_fuel: NonZero<u64>


FuncTranslatorAllocations


stack: ValueStack


instr_encoder: InstrEncoder control_stack: ControlStack buffer: TranslationBuffers


Funcldx

u32









TranslationBuffers

providers:

Vec<Provider<TypedVal>> br_table_targets: Vec<u32>



«Vec<_>»
[0..*] preserved


PreservedLocal

local: Register


preserved: Register

Appendix: Translation Sequence Diagrams


Module Parsing, Validation and Translation: Overview





Module Parsing, Validation and Translation: 1. Header Parsing




Module Parsing, Validation and Translation: 2. Code Parsing








Function Parsing, Validation and Translation [CompilationMode::Eager]: ${\bf 1.}\ Local\ Translation$





 $\label{prop:continuous} \textit{Function Parsing, Validation and Translation [CompilationMode::Eager]:}$ Finalization driver: FuncTranslationDrive validating_translator: ValidatingFuncTranslator engine: Engine FuncTranslato finish(offset, finalize) finish(finalize) $alloc.instr_encoder.update_branch_offsets(alloc.stack)$ alloc.instr_encoder.drain_instrs() finalize: init_func(
enginge_func,
func_entity=CompiledFuncEntity::new(..., intstrs, ...), inner.code_map.init_func_as_compiled(
 engine_func,
 func_entity, translation_allocs

Appendix: Algorithmic Description of the Translator

Control Instructions

nop

Nothing to do.

unreachable

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Else, encode a trap instruction.
- 3. Set reachability to false.

block

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, push the control stack to track the scope of the block, then return.
- 2. Preserve all local variables: replace all local registers on the value stack by a preservation register allocated for the given local, and encode copy* instructions that copy locals to their preservations.
- 3. Create new label for the end of the block.
- 4. Allocate new dynamic registers for the block parameters and results.
- 5. Push the control stack.

loop

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, push the control stack to track the scope of the block, then return.
- 2. Preserve all local variables.
- 3. Push dynamic registers for block parameters.
- 4. Encode copy instructions for the arguments.
- 5. Create new label for the head of the loop, then pin it.
- 6. Push the control stack.

if

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, push the control stack to track the scope of the block, then return.
- 2. Preserve all local variables.
- 3. Create new label for the end of the if-else-end (or if-end).
- 4. Allocate new dynamic registers for the block parameters and results.
- 5. Process the condition.
 - If the condition is a constant, then only one of the branches is deemed reachable (IfReachability), administer which one.

If only the else is deemed reachable, set reachability to false.

- Otherwise, the condition is a register, and both branches are deemed reachable.
 - 1. Store the input parameters for processing in the else branch.
 - 2. Ensure that preservation registers are kept for the else branch.
 - 3. Create a new label for the else branch.
 - 4. Encode the branch instruction.
- 6. Push the control stack.

else

1. Pop the control stack.

If the frame belongs to an unreachable if instruction, then the else block is also unreachable.

Push the control stack to track the scope of the block, then return.

- 2. Administer that the else block has been visited. This indicates that the control frame is if-else-end and not if-end.
- 3. If the then branch was deemed reachable, administer the reachability of the end of the then block. This is important so that the reachability of the whole if can be established upon visiting the corresponding end instruction.
- 4. If the else branch was deemed reachable, and there is an associated label for it, it means that both both branches were deemed reachable.
 - 1. If the end of the <u>then</u> block was reachable, encode copy instructions for the <u>then</u> branch result, and encode the jump to the <u>end</u> of the <u>if</u>.

- 2. Set reachability to true.
- 3. Pin the else label.
- 4. Restore input parameters.
- 5. Set reachability based on which of the branches were deemed reachable.
 - The case for none of the branches is not possible.
 - The case for both branches has already been handled.
 - If only the else branch has been deemed reachable, then reachability is set to false.
 Set it to true.
 - If only the then branch has been deemed reachable, set reachability to false.
- 6. Push the control stack.

end

Pop the control stack. There are four cases based on the control frame.

end of an unreachable block

Nothing to do.

end of a loop

Nothing to do.

end of a block

- 1. If the control stack is empty, that means the end corresponds to the top-level function call. Encode the return instruction.
- 2. If the end of the block is reachable and is branched to, encode copy instructions for the block results.
- 3. Pin the block label.
- 4. If the block is branched to, push the result registers onto the value stack.
- 5. Set reachability to true if the current instruction is reachable or the block is branched to.

end of an if

There are five cases.

Case 1: No branches deemed reachable

This case is not possible.

Case 2: Both branches deemed reachable, else block exists

- 1. Compute reachability of the code following the if-else-end, based on the reachability of
 the end of the branches and whether the block has been branched to.
- 2. Pin the else label.
- 3. If the end of the else is reachable, encode copy instructions for the else branch result,
- 4. Pin the end label.
- 5. If the code following the if-else-end is reachable, push result registers onto the value stack.

Case 3: Both branches deemed reachable, else block missing

- 1. If the end of the the branch is reachable and the branch produced results, encode copy instructions for the the branch result, and encode the jump to the end of the if.
- 2. Pin the else label.
- 3. Pop the input parameters previously stored for the else branch.
- 4. If the block produces results, encode copies from those parameters to the output registers.
- 5. Pin the end label.
- 6. Push the result registers onto the value stack.
- 7. Set reachability to true.

Case 4: Only then deemed reachable

- 1. Compute reachability of the end of the then branch.
 - This value is already set iff the else branch has been visited.
 - Otherwise, its the reachability of the current instruction.
- 2. If the end of the then is reachable and the block has been branched to, encode copy instructions for the then branch result.
- 3. Pin the end label.
- 4. If the block has been branched to, push the output registers to the value stack.
- 5. Compute reachability of the code following the if-else-end, based on the reachability of
 the end of the then and whether the block has been branched to.

Case 5: Only else deemed reachable

This is symmetric to the previous case, the only difference being in how the reachability of the end of the block is computed:

• It is reachable if the current instruction is reachable, or the else has never been visited (i.e. it is an if-end instruction).

br

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. If the branch target is the top-level frame, encode a return instruction, then return.
- 3. Otherwise, increment the number of branches for the given frame.
- 4. Encode copy instructions for the target branch parameters (i.e. inputs for a loop frame, outputs otherwise).
- 5. Resolve the target frame's label.
- 6. Encode the branch instruction with the resolved offset.
- 7. Set reachability to false.

br_if

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop the value stack for the condition.
 - If the value is zero, return.
 - If it is a non-zero constant, translate the instruction as br.
 - Otherwise, the value is a register, continue below.
- 3. If the branch target is the top-level frame, encode a return_nez instruction, then return.
- 4. Otherwise, increment the number of branches for the given frame.
- 5. If the target frame has no branch parameters, encode a branch_nez instruction, fusing with the previous instruction if possible.
- 6. Do the same if the values on top of the stack are already the branch parameters of the target branch.
- 7. Otherwise, create a new label, say, L_skip.
- 8. Encode a branch_eqz instruction to L_skip, fusing with the previous instruction if possible.
- 9. Encode copy instructions for the target branch parameters.
- 10. Resolve the target frame's label.
- 11. Encode the branch instruction with the resolved offset.
- 12. Pin L_skip.

br table

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop the value stack for the branch index.
- 3. If the instruction only has a default target, translate it as a **br** to the default target.
- 4. If the branch index is a constant, translate the instruction as a **br** to the given target.
- 5. If the target branches do not have branch parameters, then
 - Encode a branch_table instruction.
 - For each of the targets:
 - If it is the top-level frame, encode return.
 - Otherwise, resolve the corresponding label, bump branches to the frame and encode a branch with the resolved offset.
 - Set reachability to false.
- 6. Otherwise, for each unique branch target, introduce a label, say, ___i .
- 7. For each branch target, encode a branch to the corresponding Li.
- 8. Pop a number of values from the value stack equal to the number of branch parameters.
- 9. For each L_i:
 - If L_i corresponds to the top-level frame, encode a return with the values.
 - · Otherwise:
 - Pin L i.
 - Bump the number of branches to the target frame.
 - Encode copies from the values to the branch parameters.
 - Encode a branch to the actual target.
- 10. Set reachability to false.

return

Pop the value stack the right number of types and encode a return instruction with the values.

call

1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.

- 2. Pop a number of values from the value stack equal to the number of parameters of the called function.
- 3. Allocate a register span for the results.
- 4. Based on whether the function is internal or imported, encode a call_* instruction with the result registers and the function index.
- 5. Encode register list instructions for the parameters.

call_indirect

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop the index from the value stack.
- 3. Pop a number of values from the value stack equal to the number of parameters of the function type of the instruction.
- 4. Allocate a register span for the results.
- 5. Encode a call_indirect instruction with the result registers and the type index.
- 6. Encode a call_indirect_params instruction with the index and the table index.
- 7. Encode register list instructions for the parameters.

return_call, return_call_indirect

These are tail-call versions of the respective call* instructions. The difference in translation is that instead of call* they emit return_call* instructions with no results, and set reachability to false after translation.

Parametric Instructions

drop

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Otherwise, pop an element from the value stack.

select

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop lhs, rhs and condition from the value stack.

- 3. If condition is a constant, choose the corresponding value. If it is a dynamic or preservation register, encode a copy to a fresh dynamic register. Otherwise, just push the register back on the value stack and return.
- 4. If lhs = rhs, push lhs back onto the value stack and return.
- 5. Otherwise, encode the corresponding select instruction based on the types and whether the value is a register or constant.

Variable Instructions

local.get

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Push the local register onto the value stack.

local.set

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop the value from the value stack.
- 3. If the value is the local itself, return.
- 4. Preserve local register: if the local register is present on the value stack, allocate a new preservation register, and replace all occurrences of the local on the value stack by it.
- 5. An optimization is possible if:
 - The value is not a local or preservation register;
 - There is a previous instruction within the current basic block.
 - If the local has to be preserved, then:
 - The previous instruction has a small encoding (i.e. max N sub-instructions for some predefined N). Preservation and the optimization together require shifting the encoding (see below), the restriction on size bounds the translation overhead.
 - And the encoding does not use the preservation register as input.

In this case:

1. Relink the output of the previous instruction to the local variable.

- 2. If the local has to be preserved, insert a copy instruction from local register to preservation register (shifting the previous instruction).
- 6. Otherwise, if the local has to be preserved, encode a **copy** instruction from local register to preservation register.
- 7. Then encode a copy of the value to the local.

A note on local preservation

Preserving local registers requires replacing entries of the whole value stack, thus can be a costly operation. For small value stack sizes, Wasmi traverses the whole value stack to check for occurrences of the given local variable. If the value stack grows beyond a certain size however, implementation keeps track of value stack indexes for locals (LocalRefs data structure). In the worst case, the operation is linear in value stack size even in this case.

local.tee

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Perform the translation logic for local.set .
- 3. Push the value set back onto the value stack.

global.get

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Otherwise, if the global is a constant with an initializer expression, evaluate the initializer.
 - If the value is a numeric constant, push that on the value stack and return.
 - If the value is a function reference, process it as ref.func and return.
- 3. Allocate a dynamic register for the result.
- 4. Encode a global_get instruction.

global.set

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop a value from the value stack.
- 3. Encode a global_set* instruction, based on value.

Reference Instructions

ref.null

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- Push the null value corresponding to the reference type (function vs. external) onto the value stack.

ref.is_null

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop the value stack.
- 3. If the value is a const, push the constant result on the value stack.
- 4. Otherwise, encode an i64_eq_imm16 instruction.

ref.func

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Allocate a register for the result.
- 3. Encode a ref_func instruction.

Numeric Instructions

Algorithmically, translation of numeric instractions is straightforward. In the general case, operands are popped from the value stack, a dynamic regiter is puhed for the result, and the Wasmi instruction corresponding to the Wasm instruction and the operand types is encoded. However, the translation algorithm also attempts several optimizations:

- Constant propagation: if all operands are constants, evaluate the instruction, and push the
 result onto the value stack. Where possible, this is generalized to special cases involving
 register operands, e.g. instead of encoding i32_add_imm16 × 0, simply 0 is poushed onto
 the value stack.
- Peephole optimization: replace an instruction by an equivalent one. E.g. instead of
 i32_sub_imm16 x 3, instruction i32_add_imm16 x (-3) is encoded.
- Op-code fusion: the instructions is combined with the previous one. As a simple example, instead of translating to i32_and; i32_eqz, a single i32_and_eqz instructions is

emitted.

Vector Instructions

Not supported.

Table Instructions

table.get

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop the index from the value stack.
- 3. Allocate a new dynamic register for the result.
- 4. Encode a table_get* instruction corresponding to the index type (immediate / register).
- 5. Encode a table_idx instruction with the table index.

table.set

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop the index and the value from the value stack.
- 3. If the value is a constant, allocate a register for it in the constant space.
- 4. Encode a table_set* instruction corresponding to the index type (immediate / register).
- 5. Encode a table_idx instruction with the table index.

table.size

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Allocate a new dynamic register for the result.
- 3. Encode a table_size instruction.

table.grow

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop the value and the delta from the value stack.
- 3. If the delta is zero, process as table.size then return.
- 4. If the value is a constant, allocate a register for it in the constant space.

- 5. Allocate a new dynamic register for the result.
- 6. Encode a table_grow* instruction corresponding to the delta type (immediate / register).
- 7. Encode a table idx instruction with the table index.

table.fill

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop the destination, value and length from the value stack.
- 3. If the value is a constant, allocate a register for it in the constant space.
- 4. Encode a table_fill* instruction corresponding to the destination and length type (immediate / register).
- 5. Encode a table_idx instruction with the table index.

table.copy

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop the destination, source and length from the value stack.
- 3. Encode a table_copy* instruction corresponding to the destination, source and length type (immediate / register).
- 4. Encode a table_idx instruction with the destination table index.
- 5. Encode a table_idx instruction with the source table index.

table.init

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Pop the destination, source and length from the value stack.
- 3. Encode a table_init* instruction corresponding to the destination, source and length type (immediate / register).
- 4. Encode a table_idx instruction with the table index.
- 5. Encode a elem_idx instruction with the element index.

elem.drop

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Encode an elem_drop instruction.

Memory Instructions

```
i<SIZE>.load(memarg) , f<SIZE>.load(memarg) ,
i<SIZE>.load<W>_<SIGNED>(memarg)
```

Where SIZE = 32,64, N = 8,16,32, SIGNED = s,u. Implemented by translate_load.

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Read offset from instruction argument.
- 3. Reserve a fresh register result.
- 4. If the address argument on the stack is a constant:
 - Ensure address + offset does not overflow u32 (otherwise fail translation).
 - Emit I<SIZE>LoadAt , F<SIZE>LoadAt , I<SIZE>Load<W><SIGNED>At with result register and calculated address + offset .
- 5. Otherwise (i.e., address argument on stack is a register reg):
 - If offset fits into in 16 bit:
 - Emit I<SIZE>LoadOffset16, F<SIZE>LoadOffset16, I<SIZE>Load
W><SIGNED>Offset16 with result, reg, and offset.
 - Otherwise:
 - Emit I<SIZE>Load, F<SIZE>Load, I<SIZE>Load<W><SIGNED> with result and reg.
 - Followed by a second instruction Const32 with the offset value.

All cases use fuel cost for one load instruction.

```
i<SIZE>.store(memarg) , i<SIZE>.store<N>(memarg)
```

Where SIZE = 32,64, N = 8,16,32. Implemented by translate_istore.

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Read offset from instruction argument.
- 3. There are four cases, depending on the nature of the top two stack elements value and addr:
 - Both addr and value are registers:
 - If offset can fit into 16 bit:

- Emit I<SIZE>StoreOffset16(addr,offset,value),
 I<SIZE>Store<N>Offset16(addr,offset,value).
- Otherwise:
 - Emit I<SIZE>Store(addr, value), I<SIZE>Store<N>(addr, value).
 - Followed by a second instruction Const32 with the offset value.
- addr is a register and value is a constant:
 - If offset fits into 16 bit:
 - If value fits into 16 bit:
 - Emit I<SIZE>StoreOffset16Imm(addr,offset,value)
 (I<SIZE>Store<N>Offset16Imm(addr,offset,value)).
 - Otherwise:
 - Allocate a new function local constant for value on the value stack, use its register valreg.
 - Emit I<SIZE>StoreOffset16(addr, offset, valreg)
 (I<SIZE>Store<N>Offset16(addr, offset, valreg)).
 - Otherwise:
 - Allocate a new function local constant for value on the value stack, use its register value .
 - Emit I<SIZE>Store(addr, offset) (I<SIZE>Store<N>(addr, offset)).
 - Followed by a second instruction Register(valreg) to supply the value from the constant register.
- addr is a constant and value is a register:
 - Ensure addr + offset does not overflow u32 (otherwise fail translation).
 - Emit I<SIZE>StoreAt(addr + offset, value)
 (I<SIZE>Store<N>At(addr + offset, value)).
- Both addr and value are constants:
 - Ensure addr + offset does not overflow u32 (otherwise fail translation).
 - If value fits into 16 bit:
 - Emit I<SIZE>StoreAtImm(addr + offset, value)
 (I<SIZE>Store<N>AtImm(addr + offset, value)).

- · Otherwise:
 - Allocate a new function local constant for value on the value stack, use its register valreg.
 - Emit I<SIZE>StoreAt(addr + offset, valreg)
 (I<SIZE>Store<N>AtImm(addr + offset, valreg)).

All cases use fuel cost for one store instruction.

memory.size

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Translate directly to MemorySize (using a fresh register for the result), adding fuel cost for an entity instruction.

memory.grow

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Translate directly to MemoryGrow[By](size) depending on size argument (using a fresh register for the result), adding fuel cost for an entity instruction.

memory.init(data_index)

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Translate directly to MemoryInit*(dst, src, len) (depending on arguments dst, src, and len), adding fuel cost for an entity instruction.
- 3. Emit a DataSegmentIdx instruction.

memory.copy

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Translate directly to MemoryCopy*(dst, src, len) (depending on arguments dst, src, and len), adding fuel cost for an entity instruction.

memory.fill

1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.

2. Translate directly to MemoryFill*(dst,val,len) (depending on arguments dst, val, and len), adding fuel cost for an entity instruction.

data.drop(data_index)

- 1. If the instruction is unreachable, return.
- 2. Translate directly to DataDrop(data_index), adding fuel cost for an entity instruction.

Appendix: unsafe Rust Checklist

There are 112 usages of the unsafe keyword in wasmi v0.36.0 that are in scope of the audit. Below is a table that categorizes and analyses each occurrence. But first some definitions and context are required.

The unsafe code in Wasmi often involves the management of raw pointers. Raw pointers themselves are not inherently unsafe, and so long as they are *valid*, *aligned* correctly, and handled correctly according to the specific safety comments then no *undefined behaviour* will occur.

Validity

Validity of a pointer is best described in the Rust documentation for rust/library/core/src/ptr/mod.rs:

• For operations of size zero, every pointer is valid, including the null pointer.

The following points are only concerned with non-zero-sized accesses.

- A null pointer is never valid.
- For a pointer to be valid, it is necessary, but not always sufficient, that the pointer be
 dereferenceable: the memory range of the given size starting at the pointer must all be
 within the bounds of a single allocated object. Note that in Rust, every (stackallocated) variable is considered a separate allocated object.
- All accesses performed by functions in this module are non-atomic in the sense of atomic operations used to synchronize between threads. This means it is undefined behavior to perform two concurrent accesses to the same location from different threads unless both accesses only read from memory. Notice that this explicitly includes read_volatile and write_volatile: Volatile accesses cannot be used for interthread synchronization.
- The result of casting a reference to a pointer is valid for as long as the underlying object is live and no reference (just raw pointers) is used to access the same memory. That is, reference and pointer accesses cannot be interleaved.

Alignment

Alignment of a pointer is best described in the rust documentation for rust/library/core/src/ptr/mod.rs:

Valid raw pointers as defined above are not necessarily properly aligned (where "proper" alignment is defined by the pointee type, i.e., *const T must be aligned to mem::align_of:: ()). However, most functions require their arguments to be properly aligned, and will explicitly state this requirement in their documentation. Notable exceptions to this are read unaligned and write unaligned.

When a function requires proper alignment, it does so even if the access has size 0, i.e., even if memory is not actually touched.

Allocated Object

Above a pointer is described as being valid if the address is part of a memory range that is considered an "allocated object". Allocated Objects are best described in the rust documentation for rust/library/core/src/ptr/mod.rs:

An allocated object is a subset of program memory which is addressable from Rust, and within which pointer arithmetic is possible. Examples of allocated objects include heap allocations, stack-allocated variables, statics, and consts. The safety preconditions of some Rust operations - such as offset and field projections (expr.field) - are defined in terms of the allocated objects on which they operate.

An allocated object has a base address, a size, and a set of memory addresses. It is possible for an allocated object to have zero size, but such an allocated object will still have a base address. The base address of an allocated object is not necessarily unique. While it is currently the case that an allocated object always has a set of memory addresses which is fully contiguous (i.e., has no "holes"), there is no guarantee that this will not change in the future.

Undefined Behaviour

Undefined Behaviour (UB) in Rust is any code that exhibits behaviours defined in The Rust Reference chapter 16.2 Behavior considered undefined. Any code that triggers UB is

considered *unsound*. Safe code cannot trigger UB and so is automatically *sound*, while unsafe code is considered *sound* only if it cannot trigger UB.

Unsafe Rust Features

Unsafe Rust allows 5 features that safe rust does not have. Here is a legend to classify them, and another item for declaration, that will be used to categorise the type of unsafe in the analysis.

LEGEND:

DEREF - Dereference a raw pointer

CALL - Call an unsafe function or method

DECL - Declaration of an unsafe function or method

STATIC - Access or modify a mutable static variable

TRAIT - Implement an unsafe trait

UNION - Access fields of a union

Source	Туре	Precondition	Notes
ExternRef::From#L125	UNION	u64 bit pattern must be valid as ExternRef	size checked to be equal, contains u32 (always valid) and non-zero u32 (ExternObject type), None for zero ("niche" value [^1][^2]).
UntypedValue::From#L137	UNION	ExternRef bit pattern must be a valid u64	any bit patterns is valid
Externref::canonicalize#L168	UNION	0_u64 must be a valid ExternRef	is valid (encoding a wrapped None) [^1]
/wasmi/src/memory/buffer.rs#L37	TRAIT	Send for ByteBuffer type	Pointer can be shared, rest is Send
ByteBuffer::data#L140	CALL	slice::from_raw_parts	ByteBuffer fields (ptr , len) consistent by construction
ByteBuffer::data_mut#L149	CALL	slice::from_raw_parts	ByteBuffer fields (ptr , len) consistent by construction
ByteBuffer::get_vec#L167	CALL	Vec::from_raw_parts	ByteBuffer fields (ptr , len , capacity) consistent by construction
/wasmi/src/memory/buffer.rs#L203	DEREF	dereferences a raw pointer (core::ptr::addr_of_mut!) for test	Test code only
/wasmi/src/memory/buffer.rs#L209	DEREF	dereferences a static mut	Test code only
/wasmi/src/memory/buffer.rs#L225	DEREF	dereferences a raw pointer (core::ptr::addr_of_mut!) for test	Test code only
/wasmi/src/memory/buffer.rs#L241	DEREF	dereferences a raw pointer (core::ptr::addr_of_mut!) for test	Test code only
/wasmi/src/engine/resumable.rs#L1 09	TRAIT	х	Safe since InstructionPtr safely implements Sync . More explanation in Safety comment
CodeMap::get_compiled#L297	CALL	Must be unreachable.	Reliant on guarantees from translator. See hint::unreachable_unchecked
CodeMap::adjust_cref_lifetime#L33	CALL	Data must not be moved or invalidated.	CompiledFuncRef only has reference to Pin data. No unsafe Pin methods are called and the data does not have interior mutability. As Safety comment mentions CodeMap is append only. See intrinsics.rs::transmute
CodeMap::get_uncompiled#L473	CALL	Must be unreachable.	unreachable by construction. See hint::unreachable_unchecked
CodeMap::compile#L627	CALL	memory must be initialised	Saftey comment needs to be added. Memory is initialised due to result.write called on both paths of match statement. See MaybeUninit::assume_init
Stack::merge_call_frames#L81	DECL	No FrameRegisters can reference the drained CallFrame , these pointers will be invalid.	Validity must be handled at call site. Not strictly required as no unsafe directly appears in the body, perhaps ValueStack::Drain should be unsafe although it does not call unsafe code directly either.
ValueStack::stack_ptr_at#L117	CALL	Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	No checks, DECL unsafe so must be enforced at call site. All call sites provide argument of CallFrame::base_offset(), so soundness is dependent on CallSack data. See <*mut T>::add

Source	Туре	Precondition	Notes
ValueStack::extend_by#L150	CALL	new_len must be less than capacity. Elements at old_lennew_len must be initialised.	Defaults for capacity are sound, although it is possible config with bad capacity, it should error in call to reserve. new_len is within range of capacity as reserve is called. All calls have on_resize either do_nothing or shift the stack pointer. Values are not initialised in this function, instead a slice of Maybeuninit is returned, this has appropriate handling of uninit values and no UB should be possible. See Vec::set_len
ValueStack::extend_by#L151	CALL	The slice data must be valid for reads and writes. The data must be initialised. Access to data must be exclusive to slice for lifetime of slice. len * size_of::() cannot overflow isize.	The slice data is valid as the line above ensures it is within vec capacity. Slice data is not initialised and is MaybeUninit, and so call site should enforce correctness as mentioned above. Not clear access is exclusive at this point, however the only possible accesses that would violate this would be raw pointers. Not clear that size could not overflow, extra checks should be added to ensure. Note: All calls have on_resize either do_nothing or shift the stack pointer. See slice::from_raw_parts_mut
ValueStack::drop#L177	CALL	new_len must be less than capacity. Elements at old_lennew_len must be initialised.	new_len is in range. Assuming values were already initialised, shortening the length is valid - other unsafe functions responsibility ensure they are initialised. See Vec::set_len
ValueStack::drop_return#L188	CALL	index must be in bounds of slice	This appears to be able to be violated, a check should be added here. See slice::get_unchecked
ValueStack::drop_return#L190	CALL	The slice data must be valid for reads. The data must be initialised. Access to data must be read only for other references to slice for lifetime of slice. len * size_of::() cannot overflow isize.	If the check from above is included then the validity and initialisation should be sound. Not clear if there is other access and is shared read only, these would need to occur through raw pointers though. Not clear that size could not overflow, extra checks should be added to ensure. See slice::from_raw_parts
ValueStack::truncate#L203	CALL	new_len must be less than capacity. Elements at old_lennew_len must be initialised.	new_ten is in range. Assuming values were already initialised, shortening the length is valid - other unsafe functions responsibility ensure they are initialised. See Vec::set_len
FrameParams::init_next#L368	CALL	ptr::write: FrameParams.range.start must be valid for writes, and must be properly aligned. <*mut T>::add: Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	ptr::write: Validity and alignment must be established by calling context, function is declared unsafe. <*mut To::add: Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize as count is 1. If FrameParams.range.end <= FramePar is already the case, offset may point to a different allocated object or wrap, since function is declared unsafe this is the responsibility of calling context to enforce. See ptr::write. See <*mut To::add

Туре	Precondition	Notes
CALL	ptr::write: FrameParams.range.start must be valid for writes, and must be properly aligned. <*mut T>::add: Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	ptr::write: Pointer alignment and validity not explicitly enforced in function, but all call sites follow ValueStack::alloc_call_frame which is a valid context. <*mut T>::add: Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize as count is 1. debug_assert and calling context enforce these predicates, but the debug_assert could be added to extra checks. See FrameParams::init_next
CALL	ptr::read: src must point to initialised memory. src must be valid for read. src must be aligned. FrameRegisters::register_offset: count * size_of:: <untypedval>() must not overflow isize. Original pointer and offset pointer must be part of same allocated object without wrapping.</untypedval>	All ptr::read invariants (initialised, valid, aligned) are dependent on FrameRegisters::register_offset invariants being upheld, which (since the function is declared unsafe) must be determined by call site (only Executor::get_register). See ptr::read. See FrameRegisters::register_offset
CALL	ptr::write: dst must be valid for writes. dst must be aligned. FrameRegisters::register_offset: count * size_of:: <untypedval>() must not overflow isize. Original pointer and offset pointer must be part of same allocated object without wrapping.</untypedval>	All ptr::write invariants (valid, aligned) are dependent on FrameRegisters::register_offset invariants being upheld, which (since funtion is declared unsafe) must be determined by call site. See ptr::write. See FrameRegisters::register_offset
DECL	X	X
CALL	count * size_of:: <untypedval>() must not overflow _isize . Original pointer and offset pointer must be part of same allocated object without wrapping.</untypedval>	By [C5] analysis, and given that count is converted i16, count maximum possible is i16::MAX which will not overflow for 32bit and larger wordsize. If wordsize is 16bit, then the count <= 4095 for soundness. Unclear that the offset would be part of same allocated object without wrapping, since funciton is marked unsafe this would need to determined by call site 'FrameRegisters::{get
DECL	Х	X
CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe. See NonNull <t>::as_ref</t>
DECL	х	Х
CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe. See CachedInstance::as_ref#81
DECL	Х	X
CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe. See CachedInstance::as_ref#81
DECL	x	Х
1	Pointer must be aligned. Must be	Must be established at call site,
CALL	"dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	function is declared unsafe. See CachedInstance::as_ref#81
	CALL CALL CALL DECL CALL DECL CALL DECL CALL DECL CALL DECL CALL CALL	CALL CALL ptr::write: FrameParams.range.start must be valid for writes, and must be properly aligned.

Source	Туре	Precondition	Notes
CachedInstance::get_table#L138	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe. See CachedInstance::as_ref#81
CachedInstance::get_global#L148	DECL	X	X
CachedInstance::get_global#L149	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe. See CachedInstance::as_ref#81
CachedInstance::get_data_segment #L159	DECL	Х	Х
CachedInstance::get_data_segment #L160	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe. See CachedInstance::as_ref#81
CachedInstance::get_element_seg ment#L170	DECL	X	X
CachedInstance::get_element_seg ment#L171	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe. See CachedInstance::as_ref#81
CachedInstance::get_func_type_de dup#L181	DECL	Х	Х
CachedInstance::get_func_type_de dup#L182	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe.
CachedMemory::data#L233	DECL	X	X
CachedMemory::data#L234	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe. See NonNull <t>::as_ref</t>
CachedMemory::data_mut#L243	DECL	X	Х
CachedMemory::data_mut#L244	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe.
CachedGlobal::get#L306	DECL	х	Х
CachedGlobal::get#L309	CALL	src must point to initialised memory. src must be valid for read. src must be aligned.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe. See ptr::read
CachedGlobal::set#L318	DECL	X	X
CachedGlobal::set#L321	CALL	dst must be valid for writes. dst` must be aligned.	Must be established at call site, function is declared unsafe. See ptr::write
EngineExecutor::execute_root_func #L211	CALL	ptr::write: FrameParams.range.start must be valid for writes, and must be properly aligned. <*mut T>::add: Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	ptr::write: The access is properly aligned and is valid for writes, but it should be noted if there are constants allocated in the frame they are overwritten. <*mut T>::add: Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize as count is 1. Previous call to ValueStack::alloc_call_frame ensures valid range, therefore offset is in same allocated object without wrapping. See FrameParams::init_next
EngineExecutor::resume_func#L27 2	CALL	Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	Dependent on validity of CallFrame.base_offset, extra checks are recommended. See ValueStack::stack_ptr_at
EngineExecutor::resume_func#L27	CALL	From FrameRegisters::register_offset count * size_of:: () must not overflow isize`. Original pointer and offset pointer must be part of same allocated object without wrapping.	Unclear that these invariants hold, requires extra checks. See FrameRegisters::set

Source	Туре	Precondition	Notes
Executor::new#L119	CALL	Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	Dependent on validity of CallFrame.base_offset , extra checks are recommended. See ValueStack::stack_ptr_at
Executor::get_entity!#L882	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Transitively calls CachedEntity::get_*. Unclear that invariants would hold, must be established at call site, expanded functions are not labelled as unsafe, so extra checks are recommended. See CachedInstance::as_ref
Executor::get_register#L923	CALL	From FrameRegisters::register_offset count * size_of:: <untypedval>() must not overflow isize. Original pointer and offset pointer must be part of same allocated object without wrapping.</untypedval>	Unclear that these invariants hold, and it depends on the callsite of which there are many. This funciton should be declared as unsafe or there should be extra checks enabled. See FrameRegisters::get
Executor::set_register#L941	CALL	From FrameRegisters::register_offset : count * size_of:: () must not overflow isize`. Original pointer and offset pointer must be part of same allocated object without wrapping.	Unclear that these invariants hold, and it depends on the callsite of which there are many. This function should be declared as unsafe or there shoul dbe extra checks enabled. See FrameRegisters::set
Executor::frame_stack_ptr_impl#L9 93	CALL	Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	Dependent on validity of CallFrame.base_offset, extra checks are recommended. See ValueStack::stack_ptr_at
Executor::execute_load_extend#L3	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Must be established at call site, however it the function isn't marked as unsafe, extra checks should be added to ensure the invariants are upheld.
Executor::dispatch_compiled_func# L224	CALL	Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	Dependent on validity of CallFrame.base_offset, extra checks are recommended. Part of a closure. See ValueStack::stack_ptr_at
Executor::copy_regs#L272	CALL	ptr::write: FrameParams.range.start must be valid for writes, and must be properly aligned. <*mut T>::add: Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	Executor::copy_regs soundness depends on call site, which is always the call site of Executor::copy_call_params which takes uninit_params:FrameParams as argument. In particular is the responsibility of the call site to allocate enough range for all calls Executor::copy_reg to be sound. Two calls to Executor::copy_call_params exist, one preceeded by ValueStack::extend_by , the other by ValueStack::alloc_call_frame , it is not clear that these allocate enough range and extra checks should be added. ptr::write: <*mut T>::add : See FrameParams::init_next
Executor::prepare_compiled_func_c all#L317	CALL	No FrameRegisters can reference the drained CallFrame , these pointers will be invalid.	Not clear that the CallFrame on the head of the stack cannot have dangling pointers to it. This would depend on the context of the call site, if possible extra checks should be added. See Stack::merge_call_frames

Source	Туре	Precondition	Notes
Executor::execute_host_func#L508	CALL	Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	Dependent on validity of CallFrame.base_offset, extra checks are recommended. See ValueStack::stack_ptr_at
Executor::execute_host_func#L534	CALL	From FrameRegisters::register_offset : count * size_of:: () must not overflow isize`. Original pointer and offset pointer must be part of same allocated object without wrapping.	Unclear that these invariants hold, requires extra checks. See FrameRegisters::set
Executor::return_caller_results#L77	CALL	Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	Dependent on validity of CallFrame.base_offset, extra checks are recommended. See ValueStack::stack_ptr_at
Executor::execute_return_value#L1	CALL	From FrameRegisters::register_offset : count * size _of:: () must not overflow isize`. Original pointer and offset pointer must be part of same allocated object without wrapping.	Unclear that these invariants hold, requires extra checks. See FrameRegisters::set
Executor::execute_return_reg_n_im pl#L152	CALL	From FrameRegisters::register_offset : count * size_of:: () must not overflow isize`. Original pointer and offset pointer must be part of same allocated object without wrapping.	Unclear that these invariants hold, requires extra checks. See FrameRegisters::set
Executor::execute_return_span#L2	CALL	From FrameRegisters::register_offset : count * size_of:: () must not overflow isize`. Original pointer and offset pointer must be part of same allocated object without wrapping.	Unclear that these invariants hold, requires extra checks. See FrameRegisters::set
Executor::execut_return_many_impl #L232	CALL	From FrameRegisters::register_offset : count * size _of:: () must not overflow isize`. Original pointer and offset pointer must be part of same allocated object without wrapping.	Unclear that these invariants hold, requires extra checks. See FrameRegisters::set
Executor::execute_global_get#L16	CALL	src must point to initialised memory. src must be valid for read. src must be aligned.	Unclear that these invariants hold, must be established at call site however function is not declared unsafe. Extra checks are recommended. See CachedGlobal::get
Executor::execute_global_set_impl# L72	CALL	dst must be valid for writes. dst` must be aligned.	Unclear that these invariants hold, must be established at call site however function is not declared unsafe. Extra checks are recommended. See CachedGlobal::set
Executor::execute_store_wrap#L55	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Unclear that these invariants hold, must be established at call site however function is not declared unsafe. Extra checks are recommended. See CachedMemory::data_mut
Executor::execute_memory_grow_i mpl#L90	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Unclear that these invariants hold, it must be established at call site however function is not declared unsafe. Extra checks are recommended. See CachedInstance::update_memory

Source	Туре	Precondition	Notes
Executor::execute_memory_copy_i mpl#L234	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Unclear that these invariants hold, must be established at call site however function is not declared unsafe. Extra checks are recommended. See CachedMemory::data_mut
Executor::execute_memory_fill_impl #L381	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Unclear that these invariants hold, must be established at call site however function is not declared unsafe. Extra checks are recommended. See CachedMemory::data_mut
Executor::execute_memory_init_im pl#L530	CALL	Pointer must be aligned. Must be "dereferenceable". Referent must be initialised.	Unclear that these invariants hold, must be established at call site however function is not declared unsafe. Extra checks are recommended. See CachedMemory::data_mut
/wasmi/src/engine/bytecode/instr_pt r.rs#L18	TRAIT	X	Read only on Send data
InstructionPtr::offset#L39	CALL	ptr always in bounds and ptr + offset <= i32::MAX	Safety comment does not mention potential to wrap i32, debug_assert can be added to enforce bound. See <*const T>::offset
InstructionPtr::add#L47	CALL	Starting pointer and ending pointer must be part of same allocated object. Offset in bytes cannot overflow isize. Computing offset cannot involve wrapping.	As above. See <*const T>::add
InstructionPtr::get#L62	DEREF	Х	Safety comment asserts deref should be safe.
/wasmi/src/engine/bytecode/immedi ate.rs#L130	CALL	Value must be non-zero	Correct by PhantomData containing non-zero type. See NonZero::new_unchecked
/wasmi/src/engine/bytecode/immedi ate.rs#L138	CALL	Value must be non-zero	Correct by PhantomData containing non-zero type. See NonZero::new_unchecked
/wasmi/src/engine/bytecode/immedi ate.rs#L146	CALL	Value must be non-zero	Correct by PhantomData containing non-zero type. See NonZero::new_unchecked
/wasmi/src/engine/bytecode/immedi ate.rs#L154	CALL	Value must be non-zero	Correct by PhantomData containing non-zero type. See NonZero::new_unchecked
Module::new_unchecked#L256	DECL	input bytecode must be valid and consistent with config	only used for benchmark tests, see benches.rs
Module::new_unchecked#L258	CALL		see parse_buffered_unchecked
Module::new_streaming_unchecked #L281	DECL	input bytecode stream must be valid and consistent with config	never called within codebase
Module::new_streaming_unchecked #L286	CALL		see parse_streaming_unchecked
CustomSectionsIter::next#L125	CALL	str::from_utf8_unchecked	(Safety comment) read bytes constructed from a string before
Module::parse_streaming#L79	CALL		see Module::parse_streaming_impl, validator provided before call
Module::parse_streaming_uncheck ed	DECL	input bytecode stream must be valid and consistent with config	
Module::parse_streaming_uncheck ed#L95	CALL		see Module::parse_streaming_impl
Module::parse_streaming_impl	DECL	either input bytecode stream is valid/consistent with config, or validator is provided	
Module::parse_buffered#L24	CALL		see Module::parse_buffered_impl, validator provided before call

Source	Туре	Precondition	Notes
Module::parse_buffered_unchecked	DECL	input bytecode must be valid and consistent with config	
Module::parse_buffered_unchecked #L40	CALL		see Module::parse_buffered_impl
Module::parse_buffered_impl	DECL	either input bytecode is valid/consistent with config, or validator is provided	
FuncRef::From#L43	UNION	u64 bit pattern must be valid as RefType	size checked to be equal, contains u32 (always valid) and non-zero u32 (Func type), None for zero ("niche" value [^1][^2]).
UntypedVal::From#L55	UNION	FuncRef bit pattern must be a valid u64	any bit patterns is valid
FuncRef::canonicalize#L78	UNION	0_u64 must be a valid FuncRef	is valid (encoding a wrapped None) [^1]
LenOrderStr::From#L172	CALL	transmute s a str to wrapper struct	wrapper struct declared repr(transparent)
/collections/src/arena/mod.rs#L38	TRAIT	Send for Arena allocation data	Safe if contained T is Send
/collections/src/arena/mod.rs#L41	TRAIT	Sync for Arena allocation data	Safe if contained T is Sync . It is however declared Send instead (reported).
/collections/src/arena/component_v ec.rs#L16	TRAIT	Send for ComponentVec vector type	Safe if contained T is Sync
/collections/src/arena/component_v ec.rs#L19	TRAIT	Sync for ComponentVec vector type	Safe if contained T is Sync
/wasmi/benches/benches.rs#L189	CALL	bytecode input must be valid and consistent with config	only called on known bytecode in repository

[^1] https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/60300

[^2] https://rust-lang.github.io/unsafe-code-guidelines/glossary.html#niche